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KIRBY, BIGGERS, AND ASH:
DO ANY CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS
REMAIN AGAINST THE DANGER OF

CONVICTING THE INNOCENT?
Joseph D. Grano*
All legal systems have made the mistake of suspecting and watching
for voluntary errors in testimony., rather than for the involuntary
ones. Yet it is comparatively rare in a civilised society for an innocent
person to be put in peril of conviction by the lying testimony of the
prosecution; the real danger is of mistaken evidence.t

I.

INTRODUCTION

a decade after beginning a revolutionary expansion of
the constitutional protections afforded the accused,1 and just
six years after first expressing constitutional concern about the
dangers involved in eyewitness identifications,2 the Supreme Court,
in three recent opinions, virtually immunized most pretrial identification procedures from constitutional challenge. In Kirby v. Illinois'> the Court refused to apply United States v. Wade 4 and Gilbert
v. California15 to a one-man station-house showup conducted before
formal charges were filed against the accused. Four members of the
Court concluded that the sixth amendment right to counsel, which
Wade and Gilbert found applicable to postindictment lineupsi did
not apply before the start of formal judicial proceedings. Justice
Powell, concurring separately, simply refused to extend the WadeGilbert per se exclusionary rule for violations of the right to counsel;6 he did not discuss the sixth amendment issue.

B

ARELY

• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Detroit. A.B. 1965, J.D. 1968, Temple
University; LL.M. 1970, University of Illinois.-Ed.
t G. WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 89 (3d ed. 1963).
1, See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949), and applying the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to the states); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), and
applying the sixth amendment right to counsel to state felony trials).
2. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
3. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
4. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
5. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
6. Gilbert required exclusion of all testimony concerning the illegal out-of-court
identification. See 388 U.S. at 273. Wade required the exclusion of the witness's incourt identification unless the prosecutor established, by clear and convincing evidence,
the lack of taint from the out-of-court identification made without counsel. See 388
U.S. at 240-42. Although in Kirby Justices Stewart and Powell both spoke of the "per
se e.'l:clusionary rule," it is not altogether dear that they meant to limit their opinions

[719]
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Kirby left open the possibility of a due process challenge to oneman showups at the police station. In Neil v. Biggers,1 however, the
Court rejected such a challenge even though the police had not
made a reasonable effort to conduct a lineup. The Court refused to
adopt a per se rule invalidating unnecessarily suggestive procedures.
Instead, it retained the approach of examining the facts for a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Considering all the facts,
including the victim's opportunity to observe the defendant, the
Court found no such danger in the challenged showup.
Most recently, in United States v. Ash,8 the Court again refused
to extend Wade, this time to photographic displays. Curiously, the
Court seemed to recognize that photographic identifications often
lack scientific precision and are difficult to reconstruct at trial, 0 the
very evils that prompted Wade to require counsel at postindictment
lineups. Nevertheless, the Court held that the sixth amendment
right to counsel did not extend to procedures conducted in the defendant's absence. Justice Stewart, concurring separately in an
opinion more consistent with Wade's rationale, found photographic
ident!_fications less suggestive and more easily reconstructed than
lineups.10
At first glance, the three new cases seem to emaciate the Court's
earlier decisions and to curtail further constitutional development.
For example, since most lineups probably occur before the defendant's initial arraignment,11 Wade, though not overruled by Kirby,
seems to retain little practical effect. Closer examination, however,
suggests that Wade should not be precipitately inhumed. The
Court's split in Kirby invites further inquiry into the critical-stage
issue discussed in the plurality opinion. Specifically, the apparent inconsistency between an anti-Kirby "custody"12 or "focus"13 approach
and the general view permitting prompt on-the-scene identifications
to testimony concerning the out-of-court identifications. See 406 U.S. at 685-86. But see
People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 170-71, 205 N.W.2d 461, 467-68 (1973) (interpreting
Kirby to limit merely the Gilbert per se rule).
7. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
8. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
9. 413 U.S. at 313-14 Sc n.8, 316.
10. 413 U.S. at 324,
11. N. SoBEL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 30
(1972); Comment, Right To Counsel at Police Identification Procedures: A Problem in
Effective Implementation of an Expanding Constitution, 29 U. PITT, L REV. 65, 78-79
n.82 (1967) (after Wade 58.8 per cent of robbery lineups in Pittsburgh preceded ini•
tial arraignment); Note, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REv. I, 163 n.56
(1972).
12, Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
13. Cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485, 490 (1964).
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without counsel14 should be considered. The threat to sound sixth
amendment doctrine posed by this inconsistency may temper hasty
criticism of Kirby. Further, Wade's rationale may provide a constitutional basis, apart from the sixth amendment right to counsel,
for an attorney's presence at Kirby-type identification procedures.15
Such an approach might permit on-the-scene identifications in the
absence of counsel-assuming such procedures are desirable-without strained constitutional analysis. In addition, more identifications
may be brought under Wade's umbrella by recognizing the increasing importance of prompt initial arraignments. The possibility of
exhuming Mallory v. United States,16 albeit in this different context,
should also be considered.
Biggers, perhaps even more than Kirby, contains the seeds for a
future constitutional harvest. The Court seemed to reject the defendant's proposed prophylactic approach to unnecessarily suggestive procedures because his showup and trial preceded Stovall v.
Denno,17 which first established a due process exclusionary rule for
identification evidence. Biggers, therefore, may merely constitute
another chapter in the Court's congeries of retroactivity decisions.18
The constitutional door is thus sufficiently ajar to warrant continued
examination of the various identification techniques used by the
police. In addition, the possibility of using the due process clause
to mandate certain procedures not presently provided should be
considered. For example, the dangers of misidentification may warrant a due process right to in-court lineups before the trier of fact,
or a right to the defendant's relocation among spectators.
Ash cautions against undue optimism in urging either non-sixth
amendment bases for a right to counsel or an expanded due process
approach. Like Kirby, Ash limited its discussion to the sixth amendment issue, but the opinion suggests the Court's insensitivity to the
dangers of misidentification. In addition to discounting the general
hazards that accompany photographic displays, the Court almost
totally ignored the factual record, which manifested unnecessary
suggestion, if not a due process violation.19 Nevertheless, Ash demon,:,

.

14. See, e.g., Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 928 (1969).
15. See Part III infra.
16. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
17. 388 U.S. 293 (1967),
18. See, e.g., Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973); United States v. United States
Coin &: Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969);
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
19. See Part IV infra.
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strates the need for further inquiry and study. This need is particularly evident in Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, which failed
to cite one scientific study to support his conclusion that photographic displays are less conducive than lineups to misidentification.
The apparent retreat in Kirby, Biggers, and Ash will not be
mourned in many circles. Prior to Kirby, lower courts readily avoided
reversing convictions by stretching, often beyond reason and logic,
the doctrines of independent source and harm.less error.20 Part of
this attitude undoubtedly stemmed from the straitjacket imposed
on courts by the Wade-Gilbert exclusionary rules. 21 Had the earlier
cases more carefully separated the questions of right and remedy, the
courts might have been more receptive to procedural safeguards,
Alternatives to the exclusionary rules, such as cautionary jury instructions, perhaps tailored to the facts of the particular cases, therefore merit consideration, especially by those urging an expanded
constitutional approach in the identification area.
The change in judicial temperament reflected in the recent identification cases may have been inevitable, given the political climate
and the sudden vacancies that developed on the Supreme Court.22
Still, it is somewhat surprising that the Court chose the identification
cases to mark the first major retreat in the criminal procedure area.
Unlike the confession,28 wiretapping,24 and search and seizure cases,20
which furthered societal values not usually related to guilt or innocence, the early identification cases explicitly sought to protect the
innocent from ·wrongful conviction.26 Certainly it cannot be argued
that society's newly declared war against crime will benefit by increasing the risk that innocent persons will be convicted.27
20. See Note, Pretrial Identification Procedures-Wade to Gilbert to Stovall: Lower
Courts Bobble the Ball, 55 MINN. L. REv. 779 (1971).
21. See note 6 supra.
22. For a recent account of the politics of crime, see F. GRAHAM, Tl1E SELF-INFLICTIID
WOUND (1970), especially chapters one and two.
23. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
24. E.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
25. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
26. The Wade ~Court said: "The vagaries of eyewitness identification are wellknown; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter once said: 'What is the worth of identification testimony even
when uncontradicted? The identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy.
The hazards of such testimony are established by a formidable number of instances
in the records of English and American trials ••• .'" 388 U.S. at 228. "A commentator
has observed that '[t]he influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses
probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factorperhaps it is responsible for more such errors than all other factors combined.' " 888
U.S. at 228-29, quoting P. WALL, EY~•WrrNFSS IDENTIFICATION m CrulltlNAL CAsES 26
(1965).
27. See Rex v. Dwyer, [1925] 2 K.B. 799, 803 (Crim. App.): "It is the duty of the
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Rather than reflecting indifference to the dangers of wrongful
conviction, the Court's recent cases probably reflect a reappraisal of
those dangers. While any assessment involves a large degree of speculation,28 enough cases have surfaced to warrant the belief that
·wrongful conviction is more common than usually acknowledged. 29
Borchard's collection of sixty-five ·wrongful conviction cases still constitutes the best graphic study of the problem.30 Borchard found that
mistaken identification accounted for convictions in twenty-nine
of the cases studied31 and contributed to convictions in a number of
others.32 In many cases, several witnesses incorrectly identified the
innocent defendant; in the most dramatic, seventeen witnesses wrong- ·
fully identified the accused.33 Even more alarming, the real offender
often bore little or no resemblance to the person wrongfully convicted.34
Nothing has occurred to indicate that Borchard's study is less
timely today than it was four decades ago. While criminal procedure
has drastically changed, eyewitness identification techniques have
remained rather constant. In fact, as evidenced by the Supreme
Court's recent cases, judicial imprimatur is being awarded to the
very techniques that contributed to the faulty identifications in Borchard's cases.85 The continuing timeliness of Borchard's study is
police to behave with exemplary fairness, remembering always that the Crown has no
interest in securing a conviction, but has an interest only in securing the conviction
of the right person." But cf. Hook, Victims of Grime: A New Loolr. At, Their Rights,
STUDENT LAw., Oct. 1972, at 48, 51: "But it is not justice but only compassion that
leads us to say that 'it is better that nine or 99 guilty men escape pUnishment for
their crime than that one innocent man be convicted. • • .' For that is certainly not
doing justice either to the nine or 99 guilty or to their potential victims.'' It has been
argued that mere conviction, whether of someone guilty or innocent, contributes to
the law's deterrent effect. For a discussion rejecting this view, see J. FRANK&: B. FRANK,
NOT GUILTY 37 (1957).
28. J. FRANK&: B. FRANK, supra note 27, at 31-39.
29. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 197-202, 205 N.W.2d 461, 482-84
(1973). But see Hoover, The Role of Identification in Law Enforcement: An Historical
J!dventure, 46 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 613, 613 n.1 (1972} (wrongful convictions based on
mistaken identity are not common).
·
30. E, BOltCHAIU>, CoNVICTING THE !NNOC!!N'r (1932).
31. Id. at ~ii. One of these misidentifications involved identificatioil of handwriting rather than visual recognition. Id. at 29-32.
32. Id. at xv, xxv.
33, Id, at 1-3.
34. Id. at xiii.
35. For example, pretrial photographic displays and one-man showups played a
prominent role in the case involving seventeen mistaken eyewitnesses. Id. at 1-3. An
on-the-scene identification undoubtedly contributed to the wrongful conviction in
another of Borchard's examples. In that case, police attested four Mexicans shortly
after a bank robbery. When the Mexicans did not adequately account for the five guns
and two canvas sacks found in their car, the police took them to the bank, where
bank employees promptly identified them. The men were convicted before further
evidence disclosed their innocence. Id. at 74•77.
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further demonstrated by the frequent reports of mistaken identifications that, fortunately, do not lead to wrongful convictions. For
example, nonsuspect lineup participants, such as policemen and
lawyers, often are identified by victims and witnesses. 80 Such continuing incidents prompted the British Law Revision Committee to
remark recently that mistaken identification remains the greatest
cause of ·wrongful conviction.37
Even recognizing the danger of misidentification, procedural
safeguards, especially constitutional ones, are not readily apparent.
Some judges, such as Justice Stewart, find less need for counsel at
photograpnic displays than at lineups; 38 others find an equivalent or
even greater need for counsel.39 Some judges, in approving on-thescene identifications without counsel, find a guarantee of accuracy
in the short interval between the crime and the identification; 40
other judges decry such procedures and find them inherently suggestive.41 The problem stems directly from the lack of scientific
knowledge and inquiry.42 Therefore, in analyzing the recent identi36. BRlTISH CRIMINAL LAW R.EvlSION COMllU'ITEE, ELEVENTH REPORT! EVIDENCE 120
(1972) [hereinafter BRlTISH REPORT]; Read, Lawyers at Lineups: Constitutional Neccs•
sity or Avoidable Extravagance, 17 UCLA L. REV. 339, 369 n.89 (1969); Comment, sufJra
note 11, at 79 n.86. See also TIME, April 2, 1973, at 59, describing the mistaken lineup
identification of a young district attorney by several victims of sexual assaults.
37. BRITISH REPORT, supra note 36, at 116.
38. 413 U.S. at 324 (Stewart, J., concurring in Ash).
39. See, e.g., People v. Lawrence, 4 Cal. 3d 273, 481 P.2d 212, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2o-1
(1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 909 (1972) (contrary assessments made in majority and
dissenting opinions). See also People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 205 N.W,2d 461
(1973).
40. See, e.g., Bates v. United States, 405 F.2d 1104, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Burger, J.).
41. See, e.g., McPhearson v. State, 253 Ind. 254, 253 N.E.2d 226 (1970) (contrary
assessments made in majority and concurring opinions).
42. The call for a scientific approach to legal problems is nothing new. Such inquiry
cannot be expected, however, as long as the legal profession maintains its aloof distance from other disciplines. For example, early in the century, psychologists eagerly
conducted so-called reality experiments, where actors simulated events before subjects,
usually college students. The history of these early efforts is recited in Greer, Anything
But the Truth? The Reliability of Testimony in Criminal Trials, 11 BRIT, J. CRillf,
131 (1971). The early findings concerning perception and recognition prompted many
psychologists to challenge openly the law's method of ascertaining trutl1. Some observers optimistically foresaw psychologists serving as expert witnesses to comment on
the perceptive and recognitive ability of lay witnesses. See Rouke, Psychological Research on Problems of Testimony, 13 J. Soc. ISSUES, No. 2, at 50 (1957); Stern, Thtt Psy•
chology of Testimony, 34 J • .ABNoRM. & Soc. PSYCH. 3 (1939). Perhaps understandably,
the legal profession gave a cool reception to these ideas-and to the psychologists themselves. See J. WIGMORE, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF 530-32 (1931). This quickly dis•
suaded further scientific inquiry.
Today experimental psychologists are expressing renewed interest in legal problems,
To avoid repeating past mistakes, both professions must be willing to demonstrate
more flexibility. Psychologists must recognize that even reality experiments often
fail adequately to duplicate actual events and courtroom e.xperiences. See Stern, supra,
at 50. In ~ddition, psychologists must realiz~ that lawyers may reject some findings for
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fication cases, this Article will draw upon experimental results that
seriously challenge present methods; more importantly, it will seek
to define those areas where further scientific inquiry is needed to
replace judicial speculation.
II.

THE

RIGHT TO COUNSEL:

THE

SIXTH AMENDMENT

A. Kirby, Wade, and the Sixth Amendment
Chicago police officers arrested Thomas Kirby and a companion
after discovering traveler's checks and a Social Security card bearing
the name Willie Shard in their possession. After a subsequent record
check disclosed that Shard had been robbed two days earlier, the
police summoned him from his place of employment. When he arrived at the station, Shard positively identified both men, who were
sitting at a table with two police officers. According to Shard's later
testimony, a policeman immediately asked upon his arrival whether
he could identify the two men. At trial, defense counsel unsuccessfully moved to suppress Shard's identification testimony, claiming,
among other things, that admission of the testimony would violate
the Wade-Gilbert sixth amendment exclusionary rules.48 The Illinois
appellate court affirmed Kirby's subsequent conviction,44 and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review this issue.45
Upon review, the Court's starting point was the sixth amendment,
made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
which grants "an accused" the right to the assistance of counsel "in
all criminal prosecutions." Rejecting Kirby's sixth amendment argument, and thus refusing to apply Wade and Gilbert, Justice Stewart's
plurality opinion concluded that a criminal prosecution does not
begin until "the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings
-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment."46 To the plurality, this was no "mere
formalism." The start of formal judicial proceedings, it contended,
marks the point at which the government commits itself to prosecute;
at that point the adverse positions of the defendant and the governreasons umelated to validity. For example, even if prompt on-the-scene identifications
involve more risk of misidentification than subsequent lineups, the law may permit
the former as a necessary tool of law enforcement. Lawyers, who often complain about
the nonapplicability of abstract test results, must be willing to define precisely, and to
place in an adequate legal perspective, those issues that merit scientific inquiry.
43. See note 6 supra.
44. People v. Kirby, 121 m. App. 2d 323, 257 N.E.2d 589 (1970), affd. sub nom.
Kirby v. lliinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
45. 402 U.S. 995 (1971).
46. 406 U.S. at 689.
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ment have solidified and the defendant finds himself "faced with the
prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law."47
The plurality's justification for refusing to apply-or, in its
words, "extend"48-Wade and Gilbert is not persuasive. Although
both cases involved postindictment lineups,49 Wade's rationale leaves
little doubt that the postindictment language was merely descriptive.
Pointing to the vagaries of eyewitness identification and to the suggestion inherent in identification procedures, Wade found lineups
in the absence of counsel to be a serious threat to the fairness of the
subsequent trial. 50 Wade also concluded that such lineups undermine the right of confrontation at trial since they are difficult to
reconstruct either with direct evidence or on cross-examination.111
The first reason has nothing to do with the defendant's immersion
in legal intricacies. From the defendant's viewpoint, the lineup is
virtually devoid of legal issues; at the police officer's discretion, the
defendant can be required to participate, walk, talk, and wear certain clothing. 52 Of course, the proceeding must be fairly conducted,
but this has little to do with the accused since his opinion or advice
is rarely solicited or heeded. Even if the fairness requirement did
confront the accused with legal intricacies, those intricacies are oh•
viously the same whenever the lineup is conducted.
Wade's second reason for requiring counsel-to protect the right
of confrontation-does relate to the intricacies of procedural criminal
law, at least to some extent. Acute perception of all lineup conditions, including the reaction of witnesses, 63 is necessary for effective
cross-examination at trial. Yet, the Court recognized in Wade that
the perception of lineup conditions by most defendants is adversely
affected by lack of training and emotional tension. 64 These difficulties are not at all dependent upon the lineup's sequential location in
the criminal process. The defendant's inability to protect his constitutional right of confrontation remains constant throughout the
proceedings against him.
Justice Stewart also erred in arguing that the adverse positions
47. 406 U.S. at 689.
48. 406 U.S. at 684.
49. Wade referred to that fact in both its statement of the issue and its holding.
388 U.S. at 219, 237.
50. 388 U.S. at 228-35.
51. 388 U.S. at 230-32.
52. 388 U.S. at 221-23. See also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967),
53. See People v. Williams, 3 Cal. 3d 853, 478 P.2d 942, 92 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1971)
(counsel's presence required at identification immediately after lineup). Contra, United
States v. Cunningham, 423 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1970).
54. 388 U.S. at 230-31.
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of the defendant and the government do not solidify before judicial
proceedings are initiated. Presumably, the police do not arrest except on probable cause. True, probable cause may be sufficiently
weak to necessitate a precharge identification procedure.55 Nevertheless, it denies reality to describe the postcustody police attitude
as neutral or merely investigative rather than accusatory.56 In fact,
the Court explicitly recognized in Miranda v. Arizona that the accusatory function begins very soon after the defendant is taken into custody. 57
Justice Stewart was equally unconvincing in contending that the
Court's earlier right-to-counsel precedent mandated Kirby's result.
Powell v. Alabama,58 a landmark right-to-counsel case, and 'its preGideon v. Wainwright5 9 progeny60 relied on the fourteenth amendment due process clause rather than on the sixth amendment. Since
the protections under the fourteenth amendment are not limited to
any particular stage of a criminal proceeding,61 the fact that the defendants in these cases had already been charged is irrelevant.
The analysis in certain pre-Miranda due process confession cases
also seems to belie the Court's reading of right-to-counsel precedent.
In Crooker v. California, 62 for example, a unanimous Court, including Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, agreed that a state's denial of
counsel violated due process "not only if the accused is deprived of
counsel at trial on the merits ... but also if he is deprived of counsel
for any part of the pretrial proceedings," provided the denial sufficiently prejudices the subsequent trial. 63 The Court then examined
the precharge interrogation session held without counsel and, splitting five to four, concluded that the denial of counsel under the
55. According to one commentator, in these cases the need for counsel is especially
pressing, since the dangers of wrongful conviction are greatest when the nonidentification evidence is weakest. See N. SoBEL, supra note 11, at 11-12. For recent commentary
urging the earliest possible screening and disposition of cases, and recommending new
procedures for that purpose, see L KATZ, L. LITWIN &: R. BAMBERGER, JusrICE Is THE
CRIME (1972).
56. See, e.g., F. !NBAU &: J. R.Em, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFBSSIONS (2d ed.
1967).
57. 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966). See also Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 698 n,6 (1972)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
59. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
60. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). Cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942).
61. In fact, the fourteenth amendment right to counsel is not even lixnited to criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (right to retained
counsel at welfare terxnination hearings); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings).
62. 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
63. 357 U.S. at 439 (emphasis added).
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particular circumstances did not offend due process. Despite its
holding on the facts, Crooker clearly indicates that a due process
right to counsel can sometimes exist at precharge stages of the criminal process.
Kirby fared no better with its treatment of post-Gideon sixth
amendment precedent. Just eight years earlier, Escobedo v. Illinois 04
had found the sixth amendment right to counsel applicable to precharge custodial interrogation. On the facts before it, Escobedo concluded that the adversary process began in the police station where,
"for all practical purposes," the police had charged the defendant
with murder.65 In fact, over Justice Stewart's strong dissent, the
Court's opinion in Escobedo stated that "it would exalt form over
substance" to make the right to counsel depend on the existence of
formal charges.66 In Kirby, however, Justice Stewart found Escobedo
inapposite for two reasons. First, the Court in retrospect had
realized that Escobedo's primary purpose was to vindicate the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination, not the right to
counsel as such.67 Justice Stewart's argument stood on firmer ground
here than his one citation to Johnson v. New Jersey 08 indicates.
Miranda v. Arizona,69 cited by Kirby in another context, concluded
that Escobedo required counsel to dispel the coercive atmosphere of
police interrogation.70 In a remarkable and questionable reinterpretation, Miranda stated that the denial of counsel in Escobedo made
the defendant's subsequent statements the product of compulsion.71
The reinterpretation of Escobedo, however, does not lend support to
Justice Stewart's holding in Kirby. Wade, like Escobedo in its new
guise, did not vindicate the right to counsel as such, but rather
vindicated the rights of cross-examination, confrontation, and fair
trial. Escobedo still suggests that counsel must be provided at any
pretrial stage when necessary to protect other constitutional rights.
Perhaps recognizing this, Justice Stewart found Escobedo inapposite for a second reason. Again citing Johnson v. New Jersey, 72
he concluded that the Court had already limited Escobedo to its
64. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).

65. 378 U.S. at 486.
66. 378 U.S. at 486.
67. 406 U.S. at 689.
68. 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (holding Escobedo and Miranda inapplicable to cases tried
before their respective dates).
69. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
70. 384 U.S. at 466.
71. 384 U.S. at 466.
72. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
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facts. 73 This citation is somewhat cryptic; by referring to the narrow
holding in Escobedo,74 Johnson merely justified, at least for retroactivity purposes, the failure of lower courts to anticipate the more
expansive Miranda decision.75 Nothing in Johnson even remotely
suggests that Escobedo's ramifications do not extend beyond its
narrow holding. In fact, Miranda's discussion of Escobedo, just one
week before Johnson, made it quite clear that the denial of an attorney's request to see his client in the police station would, apart
from any fifth amendment considerations, constitute a violation of
the sixth amendment right to counsel.76 Furthermore, Wade, which
postdated Johnson by a full year, specifically relied on Escobedo to
support the proposition that counsel must be provided at pretrial
stages when that is necessary to protect the fairness of the subsequent
trial. 77 Therefore, if Escobedo has been limited to its facts, Kirby,
rather than some prior case, has accomplished the deed.
Justice Stewart's dismissal of Miranda as fifth amendment precedent entitled to no consideration78 was also too hasty. Miranda, like
Escobedo, granted a right to counsel during police interrogation
but, as Justice Stewart correctly perceived in Kirby, carefully premised its holding on the fifth amendment; by finding counsel necessary
to dissipate the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation,
Miranda created a fifth amendment right to counsel.79 Wade cited
Miranda to support its holding that counsel cap be required at
certain pretrial stages to protect other constitutional rights. 80 Therefore, Kirby's abrupt dismissal of Miranda can only be justified by
73. 406 U.S. at 689.
74. Although Escobedo's ramifications seemed broad, as Miranda subsequently verified, its holding was limited:
[W]here • • . the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken
into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends
itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been
denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused
has been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment ••••
378 U.S. at 490-91.
75. 384 U.S. at 733-35.
76. 384 U.S. at 465 n.35.
77. 388 U.S. at 225-26.
78. 406 U.S. at 687-88.
79. 384 U.S. at 444, 469-73, 478-79. See also 384 U.S. at 536-37 (White, J., dissenting).
But cf. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 356 Mass. 74, 248 N.E.2d 253 (1969) (Miranda invokes
sixth amendment right to counsel to safeguard the fifth amendment privilege). For an
excellent discussion of Miranda's constitutional underpinnings, see LaFave, "Street
Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REv.
40, 95-109 (1968),
80. 388 U.S. at 226-27.
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regarding Kirby as a pure sixth amendment case and nothing more.
The possibility of using Miranda or Wade to require counsel at all
pretrial lineups on a non-sixth amendment basis remains open. 81
Some considerations overlooked by Justice Stewart also support
the thesis that Kirby created a new, and previously unsupported,
limitation on the right to counsel. In Schmerber v. California, 82 the
defendant claimed that he had a right to counsel at a precharge
police-ordered blood test. The Court denied the claim not by sim•
plistically referring to the stage of proceedings but instead by concluding that counsel could not provide any assistance since the de•
fendant did not have the right to refuse the test. 83 In Wade and
Gilbert, the government tried to equate lineups with blood tests
and other preparatory steps, such as analysis of fingerprints, clothing,
hair, and handwriting-which usually occur before adversary proceedings are initiated against the defendant. To the Court, how•
ever, significant differences justified not characterizing such procedures as critical for right-to-counsel purposes. Scientific knowledge
concerning these law enforcement techniques, unlike that concerning lineups, is sufficiently available so that counsel can reconstruct
and even correct the procedures at trial through cross-examination. 84
Nevertheless, the point is that, as in Schmerber, the Court avoided
analysis based on the stage of proceedings.sr; Finally, Stovall v.
Denno,86 decided the same day as Wade and Gilbert, implied quite
strongly that the right to counsel was not limited to postcharge stages.
Stovall involved a precharge one-man hospital showup. Rather than
concluding that Wade and Gilbert did not apply to precharge confrontations, the Court held that those decisions would not be applied
retroactively.87
In short, the plurality opinion in Kirby seems wrong from every
perspective. The opinion misreads precedent so badly that it appears intellectually dishonest. Before casting final judgment, however, the practical implications of an anti-Kirby sixth amendment
approach should be explored.
81. See Part m infra.
82. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
83. 384 U.S. at 765-66.
84. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 227-28 (1967).
85. Gilbert, however, did note that the handwriting e.xetnplars were taken before
the defendant's indictment. !!88 U.S. at 267.
86. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
8'1. 388 U.S. at 300. Perhaps, to use Justice Stewart's Kirby language, the government
had already "committed itself to prosecute." Prior to the hospital showup, a jlldge had
continued the arraignment to enable Stovall to retain counsel. 888 U.S. at 295.
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B. An Anti-Kirby "Focus" or "Custody" Analysis: The
Problem of Street Confrontations
The preceding analysis suggests that Kirby should have recognized a right to counsel at the defendant's station house showup.
Such a result would still pose the problem of where, if at all, to draw
the line for sixth amendment purposes. To solve this problem many
pre-Kirby authorities, borrowing from the interrogation cases, suggested that the right to counsel should attach at all critical stages
after the police take the defendant into custody.88 This viewpoint
was criticized for going too far and for not going far enough. On
the one hand, a custody approach, without carefully -delineated
exceptions, would preclude prompt on-the-scene showups89 and certain emergency identification procedures, such as the one conducted
in Stovall v. Denno.90 Many deemed this too high a price for law
enforcement to pay. On the other hand, a custody approach would
provide the police with loopholes for avoiding the counsel requirement. If the police desired, they could easily postpone the defendant's
arrest and continue to conduct photographic displays without counsel.91 In some cases, they could also arrange precustody confrontations, perhaps by driving the witness into the suspect's neighborhood.92 These concerns prompted some authorities, who also drew
from the interrogation cases, to recommend a right to counsel at all
critical stages after the police first focus on the defendant.98 A few
others found even this approach, though perhaps appropriate in the
interrogation context, insufficient for identification purposes.M Con88. See, e.g., United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305, 1308 (3d Cir. 1970); Comment,
Right To Counsel at Photographic Lineups-People v. Lawrence, 1972 UTAH L. REv.
100, 104; Note, Lawyers and Lineups, 77 YALE L.J. 390 (1967). Cf. Quinn, In the Wake of
Wade: The Dimensions of the Eyewitness Identification Cases, ~ CoLO. L. REv. 135
(1970).
89. See note 100 infra,
90, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). See text accompanying notes 356-61 infra.
91. Note, The Right to Counsel at Photographic Identifications, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 434
(1971). After Wade, a similar concern prompted many to urge a right to counsel
at postcustody photographic displays. See, e.g., United States v. Zeiler, 427 f.2d 1305
(3d Cir. 1970); Thompson v. State, 85 Nev. 134, 451 l'.2d 704, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 893
(1969); Note, Pretrial Photographic Identifications-A. "Critical Stage" of Criminal
Proceedings?, 21 SYRACVSE L. REv. 1235 (1970).
92. United States v. Callahan, 439 F.2d 852, 865 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826
(1971), approved this strategy in dicta.
93. See, e.g., People v. Cotton, 38 Mich. App. 763, 769, 197 N.W.2d 90, 93-94 (1972).
Cf. Thompson v. State, 85 Nev. 134, 138, 451 P.2d 704, 706, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 893
(1969); Note, United States v. Wade and On the Spot Identifications: Russell v. United
States, 30 U. PITT. L. REv. 517 (1969) (rejecting focus test but arguing that the right
to counsel should attach whenever the police have probable cause to anest).
94. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 88, at 145.
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centrating on the dangers of misidentification, these critics found a
need for counsel at most identification procedures, regardless of
when they are conducted. 95
Given its decision in Massiah v. United States, 98 it was perhaps
inevitable that the Supreme Court would ultimately reject a focus
approach to sixth amendment analysis. Massiah held that a postindictment surreptitious "interrogation" 97 by a wired informant
whom the defendant mistook for a friend violated the sixth amendment right to counsel. This perplexing decision, which curiously
ignored the defendant's more persuasive fourth amendment challenge to the government's activity,98 extended the sixth amendment
into the previously immune world of police undercover activity.
Coupled with the focus analysis that Escobedo suggested shortly
thereafter, Massiah threatened to abrogate this technique of law
enforcement. The apparent dilemma materialized just a few years
later when James Hoffa, relying on Massiah and Escobedo, claimed
that undercover surveillance, prior to his arrest and after the government's investigation had focused on him, violated his sixth
amendment right to counsel. As might be expected, the Courtwithout dissent on this point-quickly retreated, labeling Hoffa's
argument a "paradoxical constitutional doctrine" that, if accepted,
would create a constitutional right to be arrested.99
At most, therefore, Kirby, if limited to pure sixth amendment
analysis, might have adopted the custody approach. As suggested
above, however, this approach would have posed a serious threat to
the present police practice of conducting prompt on-the-scene identifications.100 It can reasonably be assumed that the Supreme Court
95. See, e.g., Note, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 434, supra note 91, at 439 (recommending standby
counsel at the police station).
96. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
97. Massiah's codefendant permitted federal agents to install a radio transmitter
under the front seat of his car. The codefendant then invited Massiah into his car and
induced him to discuss the pending charges. Both men were free on bail. 377 U.S. at
202-03.
98. Commentators have convincingly argued that Massiah should have found a
fourth or fifth amendment violation instead of a violation under the sixth amendment.
To these critics, Massiah's facts, see note 97 supra and accompanying text, demonstrated
not the need for counsel but the need for restraints on governmental deceit, electronic
surveillance, and use of informants. See Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REv. 47, 55-58 (1964). But
see United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (holding, in effect, that for fourth
amendment purposes one must assume the risk that friends are secretly recording or
transmitting conversations for the government).
99. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966).
100. Prior to Kirby, the vast majority of cases exempted these identifications from
the right-to-counsel requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Gaines, 450 F,2d 186 (lid
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,vas not prepared to deprive the police of this flexibility. Kirby's
reinterpretation of the sixth amendment may, therefore, have been
dictated by the impractical consequences that would have followed
a custody approach. This assumes, of course, the nonexistence of
other means to differentiate on-the-scene and station-house custody
for right-to-counsel purposes. The pre-Kirby cases advanced two analytical bases for drawing such a distinction. The first, which may be
called the Wade-Gilbert rationale approach, used the critical stage
analysis and found prompt street confrontations less conducive to
misidentification than subsequent showups at the police station. The
second, which may be called the balancing approach, found the right
to counsel outweighed by considerations of law enforcement. Both
approaches deserve attention.

I. The Wade-Gilbert Rationale Approach
Under the first approach, courts., emulating Wade and Gilbert,
generally attempted to evaluate the hazards that attend on-the-scene
showups. In Russell v. United States,101 for example, the court of
appeals first focused on the problem of suggestion:
Whatever the police actually say to the viewer, it must be apparent
to him that they think they have caught the villain. Doubtless a man
seen in handcuffs or through the grill of a police wagon looks more
like a crook than the same man standing at ease and at liberty. There
may also be unconscious or overt pressures on the witness to cooperate with the police by confirming their suspicions. And the
viewer may have been emotionally unsettled by the experience of
the fresh offense.1 0 2

The Court then turned to counterbalancing factors, including
the danger that facial recall, which often escapes translation into
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 927 (1972); Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928 (1969); McPhearson v. State, 253 Ind. 254, 253
N.E.2d 226 (1969); Commonwealth v. Bumpus, 354 Mass. 494, 238 N.E.2d 343 (1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1034 (1969); State v. DiMaggio, 49 Wis. 2d 565, 182 N.W.2d 466,
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 838 (1971). Contra, Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935 (5th Cir.
1968). As expressed by one court:
Many different situations occur on our streets daily which, as a practical matter,
warrant if not require the police to present a suspect to a complaining witness
shortly following detention or arrest. Indeed, such confrontations often occur even
without any special police effort to bring them about. Defense counsel cannot
always be riding in police cruisers. If police are no longer able to get identification
confrontation promptly while the complainant's recollection is fresh, a drastic
change in police procedures must take place. The police need greater flexibility
than an absolute application of the Wade ruling as presently drawn appears to
portend.
United States v. Kinnard, 294 F. Supp. 286, 289 (D.D.C. 1968).
101. 408 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928 (1969). See also cases cited in
note 100 supra.
102. 408 F.2d at 1284.
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words, will diminish rapidly as time passes. During the interim
caused by delay, the witness may attempt to translate his mental
image into verbalized features, thus distorting the accurate image
he once had. Finding these considerations of greater import than the
inherent suggestion, Russell concluded that prompt on-the-scene
identifications may actually "promote fairness by assuring reliability."1oa
Not everyone agreed with Russell's assessment of the hazards of
misidentification. One commentator, for example, described the oneman showup as "the most grossly suggestive identification procedure
now or ever used by the police."104 Unfortunately, neither side cited
conclusive scientific data to support its position. Nevertheless, Russell is premised on three psychological assumptions that warrant, and
should be susceptible of, empirical exploration: First, the victim or
witness to a crime will form an accurate mental image of the offender; second, that image will be more accurate on the scene several
minutes after the crime than at the police station several hours later;
and, third, the suggestion inherent in one-man showups is not significant given the other factors.
The available evidence concerning the first assumption is inconclusive. Chief Justice Burger once likened on-the-scene identifications to the spontaneous utterances exception to the hearsay rule.100
But this hearsay exception itself has not escaped criticism. Spontaneity may overcome the threat of falsehood, but the excitement
that causes spontaneity may distort perception.100 Although phychologists generally agree that this is true,1° 1 the impact of emotional
experience has not been measured precisely. In one early experiment,
a criminologist arranged for two students to quarrel in his classroom,
with one student eventually drawing a gun. He then asked the other
class members to describe the event in writing. The criminologist
reported that the inaccuracies significantly increased as the student
accounts moved from the first exchange of words to the later and
more traumatic moments of the altercation.108 It cannot be assumed,
however, that this experiment applies to facial recognition, since
103. 408 F.2d at 1284. Like other cases, Russell also balanced the defendant's need
for counsel against the needs of effective law enforcement. See Part II(B)(2) infra.
104. P. WALL, supra note 26, at 28. See also Quinn, supra note 88, at 145.
105. Bates v. United States, 405 F.2d 1104, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
106. See Hutchins &: Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28 CoLUM,
L. REv. 432, 439 (1928) ("[w]hat the emotion gains by way of overcoming the desire
to lie, it loses by impairing the declarant's power of observation'?• But see Fm. R, Ev,
803(2) &: Advisory Comm. Notes (proposed Nov. 20, 1972).
107. See A • .ANASTASI, FIELDS OF .APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 548 (1964).
108. This experiment is described in Stern, supra note 42, at 11.
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faces are apparently easier to remember than other items.109 More
recently, experimenters showed short films depicting a gas station
robbery to two groups of subjects. In one film, the robber merely
shoved the gas station attendant; in the other film, the robber struck
the attendant with a large gun and caused him to bleed profusely.
In a later viewing of slides, the two subject groups did not differ
significantly in their ability to identify the offender.110 Unfortunately, the experimental method did not even begin to simulate the
emotional experience of a real-life robbery. At most, therefore, these
experiments only demonstrate the need for further study.
Russell's assumption of accurate perception may be subject to a
broader challenge. Some evidence supports the thesis that perception
can be quite unreliable in all circumstances. In one recent experiment, a psychologist showed a short film of a kidnapping to law
students, police trainees, and settlement house residents. In subsequent descriptions of the film, each group exhibited an extremely
high ratio of mistakes and inferences to facts correctly recalled.111
In an earlier experiment more directly concerned with identification
testimony, an experimenter had a workman walk into a classroom,
tinker ·with the radiator, and quietly exit. Sixteen days later, the
experimenter divided the students into groups and asked them to
observe lineups. In the first group, twenty-three out of thirty legal
psychology students, many of whom suspected a test from the outset,112 correctly identified the workman; only two identified the
wrong man. In the second group, forty-two of sixty-four college
109. See Zavala, Literature Review, in PERSONAL APPEARANCE IDENTIFICATION: PSYCHO·
LOGICAL STUDIES OF Hm,rAN IDENTIFICATION AND R.EcoGNITION PROCESSES, at II-3 to 9 (A.
Zavala ed. 1970) (available from the National Technical Information Service, Dept. of
Commerce, Springfield, Va. 22151) [hereinafter PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES].
110. Sussman & Sugarman, The Effect of Certain Distractions on Identification by
Witnesses, in PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDms, supra note 109, at X-1.
Ill. J. MARsHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLicr 42-52 (1966). Excluding inferences, the numbers of incorrectly recalled details as percentages of items correctly
recalled were 19.8, 24.3, and 31.5, respectively. Id. at 51. Adding inferences to the items
incorrectly recalled, the percentages became 75.6, 85.5, and 126.3. Id. at 52. See also
Stem, supra note 42, at 11-12 (experimenter had a man walk into class, pick up a book,
and carry it away; majority of class incorrectly stated that the man left the room ·
without the book).
112. The effect of knowing that a subsequent identification will be required remains
uncertain. One recent study found no significant relationship between prior knowledge
and correct identifications. On the other hand, prior knowledge, at least in combination
with other factors, significantly reduced the number of incorrect or mistaken identifications. See Alexander, Search Factors Influencing Personal Appearance Identification, in
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES, supra note 109, at III-I. It would be helpful to know whether
witnesses to crimes generally attempt to observe the offender's features for subsequent
identification purposes. See Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280, 1284 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 895 U.S. 928 (1969) (court asserted that witness was "watching for the
purpose of aiding law enforcement'').
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sophomores with no prior experience in psychological testing correctly identified the workman. More significantly, ten of sixteen
sophomores in a third group identified a participant from a five-man
lineup that did not include the workman.118 This indicates that perception may be accurate enough to guarantee correct identification of
the actual offender but insufficiently accurate to prevent misidentification of a nonoffender.114 To the extent that procedural law is designed to protect the innocent from ·wrongful conviction, it must be
concerned more with the latter data than the former. Unfortunately,
the experimenter did not test the significance of the time variable.
Russell's second assumption can be divided into two components:
First, on-the-scene identifications may be more accurate than those
conducted elsewhere;115 second, an identification minutes after the
event is preferable to one some hours later. In a study concerning the
first component, an experimenter showed a group of five picture
postcards to college students. After a twenty-second interval, the
experimenter again displayed the same cards, but he instructed the
students to select those pictures not previously seen. The data disclosed a four per cent probability that the students would fail to
identify any given card. With different students, the experimenter
modified the test, this time replacing all but one card in the second
showing. Forty-four per cent of the students failed to recognize the
repeated card in its new environment.116 Thus, it appeared that a
picture re-observed in the new environment was eleven times more
difficult to recognize than one re-observed in the old environment.
From this the experimenter concluded that station-house identifica113. Brown, An Experience in Identification Testimony, 25 J. AMER. INsr. Cn111r, L.
621 (1935). In a fourth group, five of seventeen students, who did not even observe
the original incident, identified a lineup participant.
114. Some studies have recorded remarkably high (87 per cent to 97 per cent) recognition rates. See Zavala, supra note 109, at II-7, For purposes of this Article, however:,
the number of mistaken identifications-indicating the danger of misidentification-arc
more important. For example, in one study, 128 subjects were shown 4 slides of a target
and, after a short interval, asked to view for identification purposes another 150 slides,
shown seriatim. Although 67 subjects (57 per cent) correctly identified the target, the
entire group made 1,672 mistaken identifications, with 144 of the 149 decoys being identified at least once. Alexander, supra note 112, at III-20 to 21. Of course, the scriatim
showing, the mistaken belief induced by the instructions that the target could appear
more than once, and the subjects' willingness to guess to improve the "hit" score may
have contributed to the large number of misidentifications.
Other factors, not discussed in the text, undoubtedly influence identification ability
in a given case. For example, one study found that a target's eyeglasses adversely
affected a subject's identification score. Id. at III-14 to 18. Racial factors may also play
a' role. See note 483 infra.
115. Russell did not isolate this component.
116. Feingold, The Influence of Environment on Identification of Persons and
Things, 5 J. Crur.r. L. &: CRIMINOL. 39, 46-47 (1914).
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tions, away from the crime situs, afford the criminal "altogether too
much opportunity to escape identification."117 Unfortunately, the
experiment did not really justify the experimenter's enthusiasm for
on-the-scene identifications. While the experiment did support the
common sense notion that a person is more easily recognized in a
familiar environment, it did not adequately measure the suggestive
influence of one-man showups and the increased danger of identifying the wrong person.118
Russell was on sound psychological ground in recognizing the
desirability of prompt identifications. Memory failure is directly
related to the passage of time and to interference from occurrences
between the original event and the subsequent a,ttempt to remember.119 Early experiments with nonsense syllables demonstrated a
forty-two per cent memory loss in the first twenty minutes.120 Of
course, the speed of memory decay depends on the depth of learning
and memorization in the first instance.121 Aside from this, it cannot
be assumed that test results with nonsense syllables can be transferred
to facial recognition, although some evidence indicates equivalent
rates of memory decay for words and •pictures.122 As yet, however,
the thesis that an identification several minutes after the event is
significantly more reliable than one a few hours later remains untested.
Russell's third assumption-that the suggestion involved in
prompt one-man showups does not outweigh the advantages-is the
most speculative. The experiment with the workman described
earlier128 indicated that strong suggestive influences, which could
lead to mistaken identifications, are present whenever the witness
is led to believe that the suspect is before him.124 Presumably these influences are even stronger when the police present just one suspect
to the witness. In addition, the influence of clothing and other readily
described items is not sufficiently understood. In most cases, the
witness has given a minimal description of the offender, enough, at
least, to enable the police to stop a suspect and return him to .the
117. Id. at 47.
118. Feingold did recognize this problem but did not regard it as significant. See id.
at 49-51.
119. See, e.g., Lane, Effects of Pose Position on Identification, in PSYCHOLOGICAL
STUnms, supra note 109, at IV-13.
·
120. See H. BUR'IT, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY 88 (1931).
121, Id. at 88-89.
122. See Zavala, supra note 109, at II-6. But cf. id. at II-7.
123. See text accompanying notes 112-14 supra.
124. See text accompanying note 113 supra.

738

Michigan Law Review

{Vol. '72:'71'7

scene. If the suspect fits the given description, the witness may
merely complete the picture in his mind and make a positive identification.125 This was dramatically demonstrated years ago during
the prosecution of a suspect for having illicit sexual relations with
tw-o young girls. One girl identified a man who had committed similar crimes in the past as her assailant, but only after a psychologist
asked him to change into a black coat, similar to the one worn by
the offender.126
This discussion demonstrates the need for further experimentation, simulating, to the extent possible, actual on-the-scene identifications. Such experimentation must be designed to measure statistically
the interaction effect of the several variables involved in this identification technique. Tests must then follow that compare prompt onthe-scene confrontations with lineups occurring a few hours later.
Until such tests are conducted, Russell's evaluation of the hazards of
street confrontations must be considered mere speculation. Therefore, if Kirby would have recognized custody as the crucial point for
right-to-counsel purposes, the Wade-Gilbert rationale as developed
in Russell could not provide a satisfactory basis, at least from a
scientific viewpoint, for excluding prompt on-the-scene identifications
from the critical-stage umbrella of the sixth amendment.
2. The Balancing Approach

Prior to Kirby, many courts expressed a second reason, usually
in conjunction with the .first, for excluding prompt on-the-scene confrontations from the sixth amendment right to counsel.127 Even
conceding the need for counsel under Wade's rationale, these
courts found countervailing considerations more important. Courts
125. Subjects often demonstrate this psychological need for completeness. In one
experiment, for example, a subject, attempting to recall a previously seen picture of n
family preparing to move, described a woman seated on a box. In fact, the picture
portrayed a woman on a sofa outside a house. Unable to remember, the subject unconsciously and logically "completed" the missing detail in his mental image of the
picture. See Stern, supra note 42, at 5-6.
126. Id. at 18-19.
127. McPhearson v. State, 253 Ind. 254, 253 N.E.2d 226 (1969), exemplifies this
general approach:
[T]he best interests of the suspect as well as that of efficient law enforcelJ!ent are
served when the identification takes place immediatelX, though it be without coun•
sel for the suspected party. At this stage of the pohce's investigation an obvious
need is apparent for making a speedy determination as to the suspect's identity, If
the wrong man is apprehended, certainly the police must continue their search
for the criminal. On the other hand, if the suspect is identified as the person who
committed the alleged crime, the police might then sec fit to curtail their activ•
ities as to that particular offense.
As to the interests of the suspect, it would seem desirable to have an early
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realized that the right to counsel at on-the-scene confrontations would
virtually eliminate that commonly used police technique.128 Unfortunately, most courts did not seriously consider whether prompt
street identifications constitute an essential tool of law enforcement.
The need for prompt on-the-scene identifications depends to a
large extent on the crime being investigated. For the vast majority
of crimes, such as burglary and most property offenses,129 eyewitness
identification generally plays a minor role.13° Crimes against the
person, especially homicide, assault, and, to a lesser extent, rape,
often involve familiar offenders; 181 prompt identification in such
cases is unnecessary. Robbery, on the other hand, is usually committed by strangers132 and therefore necessitates a different investigative response. Since physical and scientific evidence is generally lacking,188 the police must immediately comb the area in search of a
suspect. According to the accepted view, prompt identification procedures enable the police to resume their search in the event they
determination made as to his identity. If the suspect is shown to be someone other
than the perpetrator of the crime, his release can be immediate. 253 Ind. at 259-60, 253 N.E.2d at 229. Accord, People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 344-45
n.16, 461 P.2d 643, 650-51 n.16, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363, 370-71 n.16 (1970); Commonwealth
v. Bumpus, 354 Mass. 494, 238 N.E.2d 343 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1034 (1969),
But see Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935, 940 n.12 (5th Cir. 1968).
The concern for the suspect's interests is somewhat specious. Prompt identifications
are in the suspect's best interests only if the danger of misidentification is minimal.
But cf. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967) (prompt hospital showup of black
defendant surrounded by white officers permissible where white assault victim, in
critical condition, was the only person who could exonerate him). If the danger is
significant, the interest in prompt release must be balanced against the interest in
avoiding misidentification. Under this rationale, one would expect the suspect's preference to govern. Not surprisingly, perhaps, no court has ever given the suspect that
choice. Cf. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (warrantless search of car upheld
on theory that temporary detention of car to obtain warrant would invade the suspect's
rights; suspect not permitted to choose which invasion, the search or the detention, he
found less repugnant). The concern for law enforcement undoubtedly represents the
critical factor.
128. See note 100 supra.
,
129. The approximately 2,345,000 burglaries in 1972 accounted for 40 per cent of
the FBI's index of eight major crimes-murder, negligent manslaughter, rape, robbery,
aggravated assault, burglary, larceny of 50 dollars and over, and auto theft. FBI, 1972
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 18. Larceny and auto theft accounted for another 46 per cent
of reported crime. Id. at 21, 25.
130, PRESIDENT'S COMl\lN, ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRAUON OF JUsrICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND !Ts !MPAGT-AN AssESS:MENT 37-38 (1967) [hereinafter TASK
FORCE REPORT]; FBI, supra note 129, at 21-22, 31. Eyewitness identification is most crucial in robbery. See N. SOBEL, supra note 11, at 4-5.
131. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 130, at 14; FBI, supra note 129, at 8-10, 14.
132, TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 130, at 14, 37-38.
133. Street muggings, which account for more than half the robberies, undoubtedly
provide little, if any, evidence aside from eyewitness accounts. For a percentage breakdown of robbery into categories, see FBI, supra note 129, at 17.
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arrest the wrong person first. 134 This view, however, may not be
warranted, since the probability of s~ccess has never been documented. Moreover, the likelihood of finding a second suspect must
often be minimal. In some cases, the police will assume that they
have captured the actual offender even though the witness cannot make· an identification, especially where the stolen property has
been recovered from the original suspect. In other cases, the time
consumed in finding the first suspect and presenting him for identification will give the actual offender the opportunity to flee the immediate area. It is surprising that under an approach purporting to
balance interests, courts have never attempted to determine the
actual advantages gained by law enforcement from this identification
technique.
The right-to-counsel issue would not be resolved even by assuming a law enforcement advantage from prompt identifications. A
more fundamental question must be addressed, namely whether the
sixth amendment right to counsel should be balanced against other
societal interests. Some language in Wade suggests an affirmative
answer:
No substantial countervailing policy considerations have been advanced against the requirement of the presence of counsel. Concern
is expressed that the requirement will forestall prompt identifications and result in obstruction of the confrontations. As for the first,
we note that in the two cases in which the right to counsel is today
held to apply, counsel had already been appointed and no argument
is made in either case that notice to counsel would have prejudicially
delayed the confrontations.1a0

Other language in the opinion suggests the opposite conclusion.
In the sentence immediately following the foregoing quotation, the
Court intimated that substitute counsel might suffice when necessary
to avoid prejudicial delay.136 This sentence, however, cuts both ways.
On the one hand, it suggests that counsel cannot be dispensed with
altogether; 137 on the other, it leaves the balancing issue unresolved
where even substitute counsel would cause undue delay. 138 In succeeding language, an anti-balancing viewpoint seems more apparent.
134. See note 127 supra.
135. 388 U.S. at 237.
136. 388 U.S. at 237.
137. See Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280, 1283 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 928 (1969).
·
138. See Russell v. United States, 408 F.2d 1280, 1283-84 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied,
395 U.S. 928 (1969).

March 1974]

Kirby, Biggers, and Ash

741

Quoting Miranda, the Court answered the contention that counsel
might obstruct identification procedures:
[A]n attorney is merely exercising the good professional judgment he
has been taught. This is not cause for considering the attorney a
menace to law enforcement. He is merely carrying out what he is
sworn to do under his oath-to protect to the extent of his ability
the rights of his client. In fulfilling this responsibility the attorney
plays a vital role in the administration of criminal justice under our
Constitution.139
Although Wade appears inconclusive, the better view would
seem to support an absolute sixth amendment right to counsel that
cannot be balanced away.140 The sixth amendment states categorically that the accused shall have the right to counsel's assistance in
all criminal prosecutions. Under traditional analysis, counsel is required not only at trial but at all critical stages of the prosecutionthose stages where substantial rights of the accused may be affected.141
The pre-Kirby advocates of the balancing approach conceded, in
effect, that a street confrontation constitutes a critical stage, but they
found other interests to be overriding. The danger is that this reasoning, which ignores the sixth amendment's mandate, would appear
equally applicable to the trial stage. Indeed, it was argued in Argersinger v. Hamlin 142 that society could not afford to recognize an absolute right to counsel in misdemeanor trials.143 Even if balancing
would ultimately produce the "correct" result, this argument begs
the question; the method of analysis rather than the result is at issue.
Under the balancing approach, "shall" and "all" lose their etymological meanings. The sixth amendment is emaciated when the
issue of its applicability is stated in terms of cost.144 Arbitrary lines,
139. 388 U.S. at 238, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 480-81 (1966).
140. Cf. Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935, 940 n.12 (1968).
141. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
142. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
143. 407 U.S. at 59-61 (Powell, J., joined by Rhenquist, J., concurring). The majority
rejected this argument and extended the right to appointed counsel to all cases as a
prerequisite to imposition of imprisonment.
144. Justice Black criticized a slightly different application of the balancing approach, but his words are equally apropos here:
The Court considers the "right to a fair trial" to be the overriding "aim of the
right to counsel" • • • and somehow believes that this Court has the power to
balance away the constitutional guarantee of right to counsel when the Court
believes it unnecessary to provide what the Court considers a "fair trial." But I
think this Court lacks constitutional power thus to balance away a defendant's
absolute right to counsel which the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee
him.
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 279 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting in part). Cf. Mayer
v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1971) (equal protection clause flatly prohibits,
without balancing, the denial of effective appeals to indigent appellants).
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like that drawn in Kirby, at least leave the sixth amendment with
full vitality for those stages where it does apply.
In short, if Kirby would have adopted a custody or focus analysis
for sixth amendment purposes, neither the balancing approach nor
the Wade-Gilbert approach145 could provide an acceptable basis for
exempting on-the-scene confrontations from the right-to-counsel requirement.146 Stated differently, Kirby's withdrawal of the sixth
amendment from precharge criminal procedure may be supported
by practical considerations, assuming the desirability of maintaining
prompt street confrontations as a law enforcement technique. 147
This does not necessarily mean, however, that the defendant in
Kirby should not have been provided counsel before his stationhouse showup. 'What Kirby overlooked,148 and what now merits consideration, is the possibility of using a more flexible constitutional
basis, such as due process, to require counsel at the station house
but not on the street.
Ill.

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: .ALTERNATE CONSTITUTIONAL BASES

A. Due Process: Critically Important Procedures and
Fundamental Fairness
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has long
been recognized as an independent source for the right to counsel.
Prior to Gideon v. W ainwright,149 due process constituted the only
basis for asserting a federal right to counsel in state criminal cases.100
To prevail, the defendant had to show that special circumstarn;:es
made the denial of counsel in his particular case fundamentally unfair.151 It soon become evident, however, that due process could re145. See Part II(B)(l) supra.
146. In bis Kirby dissent, Justice Brennan found it unnecessary to consider the on•
the-scene issue. 406 U.S. at 698 n.5. This is unfortunate since bis dissent necessarily
raises serious constitutional questions about on-the-scene confrontations.
147. But cf. text accompanying notes 129-34 supra. It is safe to assume that courts
will place the burden of proof on those challenging the utility of this law enforcement
technique.
148. Kirby referred to "the right to counsel contained in the SLxth and Fourteenth
Amendments," 406 U.S. at 688. It is clear, however, that the Court cited the fourteenth
amendment only to illustrate the vehicle through which the sixth became applicable
to the states. First, the Court in a subsequent paragraph referred specifically and
exclusively to the "all criminal prosecutions" language of the sLxth amendment. 406
U.S. at 690 n.7. Second, the Court also referred to the "Fifth and Fourteenth Amend•
ment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination," 406 U.S. at 688. Third, the
Court never discussed the possibility of using due process as an independent source
for the right to counsel. See also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 303 n,3 (1973)
(referring to Kirby as a sixth amendment case).
149. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
150. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U,S,
45 (1932).
151. l3etts v. l3rady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
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quire a more expansive right to counsel, not tied to the facts of the
particular case. In Bute v. Illinois152 the Court spoke of an absolute
fourteenth amendment right to counsel in all capital cases;158 in
subsequent noncapital cases before Gideon, the Court so readily
found special circumstances that one could reasonably argue for the
existence of an absolute right to counsel under the fourteenth amendment.154
Gideon added a sixth amendment basis for the right to counsel
without undermining the independent due process doctrines. PostGideon cases continued to recognize the due process clause as a
source of an absolute right to counsel in certain noncriminal contexts. For example, Kent v. United States155 found it fundamentally
unfair for a juvenile court to waive jurisdiction over an alleged
delinquent without first granting him a hearing and the right to
be represented by counsel. In language analogous to that used in its
sixth amendment cases, the Court described the waiver issue as
"critically important" to the juvenile.156 One year later, In re
Gault151 established an absolute right to counsel in all juvenile delinquency trials. Both cases carefully and unavoidably premised their
holdings on due process, not on the sixth amendment. The sixth
amendment's language limits its application to criminal prosecutions,158 and the Court, though generally eschewing labels, has refused to equate delinquency proceedings with adult criminal trials.159
More recently, courts have extended the due process right to
counsel into areas less akin to criminal prosecutions. The slow movement in this direction started when the Supreme Court, in Goldberg
152. 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
153. 333 U.S. at 6'74, 6'76. See also Crooker v. California, 35'7 U.S. 433, 441 n.6 (1958);
Hollman v. Manning, 262 F.2d 656, 659 (4th Cir. 1959). The Supreme Court's references
to this right were always in dicta. See Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State
Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 DE PAULL. R.Ev. 213, 227-28 n.74 (1959).
154. The Court found special circumstances in every case decided after 1950. See
Gideon v. Wainwright, 3'72 U.S. 335, 351 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring). In Gideon,
Justice Harlan dissented from the view that the fourteenth amendment incorporates
the sixth; nevertheless, he agreed that defendants in state criminal trials should have
an absolute fourteenth amendment (due process) right to counsel.
155. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). Kent is really a fifth amendment due process case, since the
fourteenth amendment is limited to state action. The due process clauses in the fifth
and fourteenth amendments are otherwise identical.
156. 383 U.S. at 553, 560-61, 563.
15'7. 387 U.S. 1 (196'7).
158. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ••• to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.'' U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
159. In addition to Kent and Gault, see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528
(1971) (refusing to grant juveniles a right to trial by jury in delinquency proceedings).
Adults being criminally prosecuted have a sixth amendment right to trial by jury
in all cases where the punishment may exceed six months' imprisonment. Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66 (19'70); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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v. Kelly, 160 prohibited the states from terminating welfare benefits
without first affording the recipient a hearing, where he could be
represented at least by retained counsel. Some lower courts, going
even further, have granted an absolute due process right of appointed
counsel to defendants in civil contempt proceedings,161 to parents
charged with neglect in proceedings to deprive them of custody of
their children,162 and, most recently, to defendants in divorce proceedings.168 The continued vitality of the fourteenth amendment
in this context suggests the possibility of finding a due process right
to counsel in Kirby-type identification procedures where the sh:.th
amendment does not apply.164 It need only be shown that a given
identification procedure is "critically important" to the maintenance
of the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. At the outset, it
should be recognized that the analysis required to resolve this issue
is somewhat different from that involved in determining "critical
stages" for sixth amendment purposes. While a balancing analysis is
incongruous with the sbcth amendment's language and spirit,10u the
more flexible due process standard requires that the court weigh the
individual's interests against those of the state.166 This balancing
need not relate to the facts of each particular case, but, instead, as in
Goldberg, may be undertaken with respect to a certain stage or pro160. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Goldberg is the only civil case in which the Supreme Court
has found an absolute due process right to counsel. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S •
. 67, 80-84 (1972) (right to hearing in replevin cases; presumably retained counsel could
represent defendant).
161. United States v. Sun Kung Kang, 468 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1972).
162. Danforth v. State Department of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d '194 (Me.
1973); In re B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972); State v. Jamison,
251 Ore. 114, 444 P.2d 15 (1968). Contra, Robinson v. Kaufman, 8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 87
Cal. Rptr. 678 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 964 (1971).
163. Vanderpool v. Vanderpool, 74 Misc. 2d 122, 344 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1978),
164. Cf. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1345-47 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wright, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973); State v. Anderson, 8 Wash, App. 782, -,
509 P.2d 80, 82-83 (1973) (dictum) (Kirby does not preclude a fifth amendment right
to counsel at psychiatric interviews). It should not be assumed that such a right will
readily be found, since most courts have eagerly, and with little independent analysis,
followed Kirby. See, e.g., United States v. Abshire, 471 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Savage, 470 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 930 (1973); United
States v. Canty, 469 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Moore v. Eyman, 464 F.2d 559 (9th Cir.
1972); Jackson v. State, 17 Md. App. 167, 300 A.2d 430 (1973) (abandoning prior con•
trary position); State v. Northrup, 303 A.2d 1 (Me. 1973); State v. Farrow, 61 N.J. 434,
294 A.2d 873 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973). Contra, People v. Anderson, 389
Mich. 155, 205 N.W.2d 461 (1973). Two state courts have urged the police to permit
defense counsel to be present at all lineups. Baker v. State, - Nev.-,-, 498 P.2d 1310,
1312 n.2 (1972); Chandler v. State, 501 P.2d 512, 520 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972). But cf,
Reed v. Warden, - Nev. -, 508 P.2d 2 (1973); Stewart v. State, 509 P.2d 1402 (Okla,
Crim. App. 1973).
165. See text accompanying notes 135-44 supra.
166. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-65 (1970).
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cedure. For example, the individual's interest in having counsel's
assistance to prevent unfairness may be outweighed by the needs of
law enforcement to conduct prompt on-the-scene identifications.167
On the other hand, the individual's interests may be predominant
in station-house identifications where promptness is not a factor. 168
United States v. Wade169 is a suitable starting point for analysis
of the defendant's interests. Although Wade recognized a sixth
amendment right to counsel at postindictment lineups, its rationale
included due process overtones.170 Much as Miranda created a fifth
amendment right to counsel to help dispell the compulsion inherent
in custodial interrogation,171 Wade required counsel to prevent, or at
least to reduce, the suggestion inherent in identification procedures
and to enhance the right to a fair trial.172 Like M iran,da, Wade seemed
not to vindicate the right to counsel as such; instead, it viewed counsel as supportive of the defendant's other constitutional rights. The
Court made this clear early in the opinion in the way it structured
the issue for subsequent discussion:
[T]he principle of Powell v. Alabamat173 J and succeeding cases requires that we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to
determine whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve
the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself. It calls upon us to analyze
whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres
in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help
avoid that prejudice.174
In language rich with due process flavor, Wade then found identification procedures to be "peculiarly riddled with innumerable
dangers and variable factors that might seriously, even crucially,
derogate from a fair trial."175 Foremost among these dangers was the
167. Cf. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293 (1967). These cases balanced unfairness to the accused against the needs of law
enforcement with respect to photographic displays and showups, respectively.
168. To use Justice Schaefer's words, due process "includes those procedures that
are fair and feasible in the light of ••. existing values and capabilities." Schaefer,
Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1, 6 (1956).
169. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
170. See Gilligan, Eyewitness Identification, 58 Mn.. L. REv. 183, 190 (1972); Quinn,
supra note 88, at 145. Cf. Casenote, 6 IND. L. REv. 365, 371-72 (1972).
171. See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra.
172, 388 U.S. at 228-29.
173. It is worthwhile remembering that Powell is based on due process, not the
sixth amendment. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
174. 388 U.S. at 227 (emphasis original).' See also text accompanying notes 49-51
supra.
175. 388 U.S. at 228.
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influence of improper suggestion, intentional or othenvise, upon the
witness. 176 The harm from such suggestion could well be irreparable,
since "[i]t is a matter of common experience that, once a witness has
picked out the accused at the line-up, he is not likely to go back on
his word later on . . . ." 177 The threat to a fair trial was further
aggravated by the difficulty in detecting suggestion and in reconstructing the identification procedure at trial.1 78 Bright lights often
prevent the defendant from observing the witnesses and the police
officers who conduct the lineup. The defendant's emotional tension
and lack of training usually preclude his detection of improper in-·
fluences. 179 The witnesses share the same handicaps, which reduce the
likelihood of their being alert to prejudicial conditions.180 To Wade,
an attorney's presence at the initial identification would eliminate
these dangers and help guarantee the defendant a fair trial. Counsel
would be able to detect the suggestive influences, thus breaching the
wall of secrecy.181 Also, counsel's firsthand knowledge would help
him effectively to cross-examine the witnesses at trial and would thus
enhance the defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses
against him..182 Finally, and perhaps most important, counsel would
often be able to avert the prejudicial suggestion in the first instance.183 Since not everyone agreed with Wade's conclusions,184
however, the issue merits further examination.
The causes of mistaken identification include the innate deficiencies in human perception and memory and the general susceptibility of witnesses to suggestion.185 While counsel cannot affect the
former, he should be able to reduce the influence of the latter. In
addition, the empirical studies reviewed earlier indicate that human
perception may be even more deficient than is commonly acknowledged.186 If so, witnesses are even more susceptible to improper suggestion, and the need for corrective safeguards is even greater. Some
critics respond, however, that the police, if really bent on cheating,
176. 388 U.S. at 228-29.
177. 388 U.S. at 229, quoting Williams 8: Hammelmann, Identification Parades
-1, 1963 CRIM. L. REv. (Eng.) 479, 482.
178. 388 U.S. at 230-32.
179. 388 U.S. at 230-32.
180. 388 U.S. at 231-32.
181. See 388 U.S. at 234-35.
182. 388 U.S. at 235-36.
183. 388 U.S. at 235-36.
184. See 388 U.S. at 254 (White, J., dissenting). See also Read, supra note 36, at
365-67.
185. P. WALL, supra note 26, at 8-9, 199.
186. See text accompanying notes 105-26 supra.
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can accomplish their objective by approaching the witness before the
identification procedure.187 Even if this is possible, counsel will still
be beneficial in those cases where the desire to cheat exists but is less
fervent or where the suggestion is primarily unintentional.
Some critics have even minimized counsel's importance where the
suggestion is unintentional.188 According to their reading of Wade,
the Court envisioned counsel in a passive role, one of observation
but not participation. In their view, photographic devices would
be more accurate than counsel in recording the identification procedure.189 This criticism ignores Wade's emphasis on preventing the
suggestion in the first instance: " ... [E]ven though cross-examination
is a precious safeguard to a fair trial, it cannot be viewed as an
absolute assurance of accuracy and reliability. Thus in the present
context, where so many variables and pitfalls exist, the first line of
defense must be the prevention of unfairness and the lessening of
the hazards of eyewitness identification at the lineup itself."190 The
need for counsel to prevent unfairness warrants special emphasis
since witnesses rarely retract earlier identifications. In psychological
terms, the witness's mental image of the defendant formed after
careful viewing at the identification procedure probably overshadows
his or her earlier mental image of the actual offender.191 The danger
arises not because the witness chooses to lie, but rather because the
witness sincerely believes that the new image portrays the actual
offender. Therefore, if the witness has erred, cross-examination will
frequently fail to reveal it. Nor will counsel adequately protect the
innocent by attempting to counter a witness's positive identification ,
with a jury argument concerning suggestive pretrial identification
techniques.
Some will respond that the Stovall-Simmons rule,192 which requires the exclusion of eyewitness testimony whenever the identification procedure is so impermissil?ly .suggestive that it raises a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, provides sufficient
protection against ·wrongful conviction. Under this rule, however,
the defendant is not protected against substantial suggestion that
187. Read, supra note 36, at 365.
188. Id. See also Note, Lawyers and Lineups, 77 YALE L.J. 390, 398 (1967).
189. See Read, supra note 36, at 365,
190. 388 U.S. at 235.
191. Cf. P. WALL, supra note 26, at 68; Williams & Hammelmann, supra note 177,
at 484. English courts have long exhibited sensitivity to this matter. See Rex v. Dwyer,
[1925] 2 K.B. 799 (Crim. App.). This is another area that warrants further empirical
exploration.
192. See text accompanying notes 356-65, 384-89 infra.
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does not quite amount to a due process violation. Therefore, despite
the semantic difficulties, it can be argued that due process may require a right to counsel to prevent unfairness that itself may not
violate the fourteenth amendment.103 In other words, counsel may be
necessary to prevent both unfairness that violates due process and
other suggestion that, without denying due process, substantially
and unnecessarily increases the risk of misidentification.194
The need for counsel to prevent suggestion is quite evident. The
cases that demonstrate inappropriate suggestion that fell short, at
least to the reviewing courts, of constituting a due process violation
under Stovall and Simmons are legion. The techniques that continue to surface would exhaust the gamut of the most vivid imagination: having the accused, partially dressed in clothing similar to that
worn by the offender, appear in a lineup with a police officer dressed
in a business suit;195 requiring each lineup participant to identify
himself after the victim has learned the offender's name from another
witness; 196 singling out the defendant from fellow prisoners in jail; 191
unnecessarily presenting the suspect alone, either in person or by
picture; 108 conducting several confrontations before the same witness,
with only the defendant common to each; 199 telling the robbery victim at a onetman shm\TUp that the robber has been caught; 200 presenting pictures of the defendants in color and of the nonsuspects
in black and white. 201 While it may be technically correct to hold
193. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 232 (1967) (referring to "the potential"
for prejudice in identification procedures); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966)
(counsel provided as a safeguard against the "potentiality" for compulsion). In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970), the Court said: "The right to be heard would
be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by
counsel" (emphasis added). The Court did not say that every hearing without counsel
would be fundamentally unfair. Moreover, the Court provided counsel even though
the welfare recipient presumably could have challenged substantial unfairnes.g on traditional due process grounds. Cf. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299 (1967) (Wade not retro•
active because not all lineups without counsel are unfair).
194. Cf. Baker v. State, - Nev.-, 498 P.2d 1310, 1312 n.2 (1972). See also State v.
Batchelor, 418 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. 1967) (defendant tlle only woman in lineup).
195. People v. :Barge, 7 Ill. App. 3d 721, 288 N.E.2d 492 (1972).
196. State v. West, 484 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. 1972).
197. State v. Sheardon, 31 Ohio St. 2d 20, 285 N.E.2d 335 (1972).
198. See, e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); People v. Holiday, 47 Ill, 2d 300,
265 N.E.2d 634 (1970). Cf. Mason v. United States, 414 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(finding a due process violation).
199. United States v. Williams, 436 F.2d 1166 (9tll Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
912 (1971). Cf. People v. :Brunson, I Cal. App. 3d 226, 81 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1969) (showup
after unsuccessful lineup).
200. People v. Gonzalez, 27 N.Y.2d 53, 261 N.E.2d 605, 313 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 996 (1971). Cf. Bradley v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W,2d 61 (Ky.
1969).
201. United States v. Cunningham, 423 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1970).
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that the defendants in these cases were not denied due process, the
identification techniques used only increased the possibility of ·wrongful conviction. In each, an attorney could have significantly reduced
this unnecessary and unacceptable risk. 202
One critic has argued that counsel, much like the defendant and
witnesses, may not be schooled adequately in detecting suggestive
influences.203 While it is difficult to believe that an astute attorney
would not have detected the abuses listed above, suggestion may
sometimes be sufficiently subtle to avoid easy detection. A recent
Canadian experiment provides an example worthy of extended consideration.204 Following a robbery, a department store cashier described the robber as neatly dressed and rather good looking. Although she could not remember any details concerning his facial or
physical characteristics, she identified the defendant several days
later at a twelve-man lineup, which the police photographed. Sometime later, researchers showed the lineup photograph to twenty
female subjects and asked them to rate each lineup participant on an
eleven point scale: (I) extremely good looking, (3) very goqd-looking,
(5) somewhat good looking, (7) about average, (9) not good looking,
(11) definitely not good looking. The defendant averaged 5.95, while
the average of the other participants ranged from 7.20 to 9.40.205
The researchers then compared each subject's rating of the defendant
with her rating 0£ each other lineup participant. In the 220 comparisons, the defendant was rated more attractive 179 times, the defendant and the compared participant were rated equally attractive
23 times, and the defendant was rated less attractive 18 times. In a
second study, the researchers asked twenty-one different female
subjects, informed only that the offender was rather good looking,
to make an identification. Significantly defying chance probabilities,
eleven women chose the defendant, and four picked him as their
second choice.206
Admittedly, the suggestion revealed by the experiment wollld
have been difficult for' an attorney to detect; this problem will recur
202. These are but a few of the available examples. A sense of the dimensions of
the problem can be quickly developed by skimming through the reporters. See Note,
supra note 20; Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 791 (1971).
203. Read, supra note 36, at 366.
204. Doob &: Kirshenbaum, Bias in Police Lineups-Partial Remembering, 1 J.
POLICE SCI. 8: Al>MIN. 287 (1973).
205. This difference was statistically significant.· Id. at 291.
206. The researchers argued that a nonwitness at a completely unbiased lineup
should have a 1/n probability of picking the defendant, where n is the number of
people in the lineup. By chance, therefore, the defendant should have been chosen
less than twice (1/12 x 21). Id. at 290, 292.
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whenever the characteristics remembered by the witness are not
physically measurable. However, this does not prove the foolhardiness of requiring counsel; on the contrary, it dramatizes the importance of additional safeguards to guarantee counsel's effectiveness.
Prior to the identification procedure, counsel should be given the
witness's complete description of the offender.207 It may even be wise
to permit counsel to interview the witness before the identification.
For example, an attorney in the Canadian case, armed with the
cashier's prior description, would have known what to observe and,
like the subjects in the experiment, might have noticed the defendant's relative attractiveness. Counsel should also be permitted to
propose changes in the identification procedure.208 By granting
counsel an active role, the goal of preventing mistaken identifications can be more nearly realized.
The available scientific evidence clearly indicates that Wade
correctly perceived the defendant's substantial need for counsel's
assistance in pretrial identification procedures. The remaining ques•
tion under due process analysis is whether society has more substantial countervailing interests in not providing counsel. It has been
argued, for example, that counsel will convert the confrontation
into a discovery proceeding, thereby increasing the risk that witnesses
will be intimidated.209 This argument is not persuasive. Many state
statutes already grant the defendant a pretrial right to the names of
witnesses who will testify against him. 210 Reflecting the trend toward
broader discovery, the American Bar Association recently recommended pretrial disclosure of the names and addresses of prospective
witnesses, together with their relevant statements.211 According to
the attached commentary, such discovery "not only facilitates plea
discussions and agreements but also goes to the heart of the general
proposition that defense counsel must be permitted to prepare adequately to cross-examine the witnesses •... " 212 While a substantial
risk of witness intimidation may sometimes exist, special safeguards
can be provided. As Wade recognized, masking or other procedures
can be employed to prevent recognition. 218 0£ course, defense coun207. United States v. Allen, 408 F.2d 1287, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Sanford,
Eye Witness Identification in Criminal Cases, 46 FLA. B.J. 412, 414 (1972).
208. See id. at 414.
209. Read, supra note 36, at 373-75.
210. A list of statutes can be found in ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL, Commentary
at 57 (1970) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
,
211. Id. § 2.l(a)(i).
212. Id., Commentary at 56.
213. 338 U.S. at 238 n.28.
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sel may discover the inability of some witnesses to identify the defendant. This provides no windfall, however, since the state has a
constitutional duty to disclose all favorable evidence that is material
to the defendant's case.214
Another argument is that counsel will urge the defendant to alter
his appearance to make identification difficult.215 . There are several
answers to this argument. First, such conduct raises serious ethical
questions that can best be remedied outside the context of criminal
procedure. The American Bar Association's response to the unethicalcounsel hobgoblin, which long impeded reform in pretrial discovery,
is apropos: "[T]he answer to the alleged untrustworthiness of counsel is not the denial of procedures beneficial to the process but improvement in the definition of standards for Ia-wyers' conduct and
more effective discipline."216 In any event, counsel need not actually
attend ~he identification procedure to make such suggestions. Moreover, if the opportunity to modify appearance, such as by having
a haircut or shaving a beard, exists, most defendants will not require
counsel's advice to take such action.
Economic burdens may sometimes be a significant factor in a due
process balancing analysis. 217 However, society's interest in protecting the innocent from wrongful conviction seems to outw-eigh the
financial burden placed on the state.218 Further, one must doubt the
significance of the economic argument. Since most defendants will
either retain or be appointed counsel before the final disposition of
their cases, the financial cost of providing counsel somewhat earlier
should be minimal.
The one argument with some conceivable merit is that a due
process right to counsel would, like its sixth amendment counterpart,
abrogate certain necessary law enforcement techniques, primarily
prompt on-the-scene identifications. At present, it is difficult to balance the need for this law enforcement technique against the defendant's interest in avoiding mistaken identification. As previously
discussed,219 empirical research has not yet measured, either in iso214. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Quinn, 357 F. Supp.
1348 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
215. Read, supra note 36, at 374-75.
216. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 210, Commentary at 39.
217. See note 168 supra.
218. For example, in Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), the city con-

tended that economic considerations outweighed the interests of an indigent misdemeanant, whose sentence did not include incarceration, in obtaining a free transcript
for appellate purposes. The Court, however, refused even to consider the economic
burden as an element of analysis. 404 U.S. at 196-97. Cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972).
219. See text accompanying notes 105-26 supra.
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lation or comparatively, the risks that attend this identification procedure. On the other hand, previous discussion also suggested that
prompt on-the-scene identifications may not be essential to effective
law enforcement.22° Further empirical evidence is required to weigh
the interests with confidence. Nevertheless, courts should be especially cautious in evaluating arguments based on the need for
promptness. For example, the longer the interval between the crime
and the suspect's arrest, the less convincing the need for prompt
identification. Once substantial time has elapsed, the police should
return the suspect to the station and provide him with counsel for
the identifi.cation.221
Counsel should always be required for station-house identifications. The need for promptness will rarely, if ever, be evident when
the police have already consumed time in bringing both the suspect
and witness to the station. In Kirby, for example, the showup occurred two days after the crime; 222 a few hours delay simply could
not have mattered. When promptness is not a factor, no countervailing considerations outweigh the defendant's need for counsel's assistance.
In summary, a due process right to counsel can apply to critically important stages of the criminal process even though the sixth
amendment does not. Unlike the sixth amendment, due process requires a balancing analysis, which enhances flexibility. At least with
respect to station-house identification procedures, the need for counsel far outweighs any conceivable countervailing interest. Therefore,
just as the sixth amendment under Wade and Kirby provides counsel for postcharge identifications, due process should require counsel
in all precharge station-house confrontations. More evidence is
needed to balance the interests with respect to prompt on-the-scene
identifications. Until that evidence is garnered, due process provides
the flexibility to maintain the status quo.
B. Due Process: Special Circumstances in a Given Case
A second, even more flexible due process analysis should also be
considered. Rather than broadly focusing on particular police procedures, the analysis can be limited to the facts in a given case. In
Betts v. Brady, 223 where this approach originated, the Supreme
220. See text accompanying notes 129-34 supra.
221. Compare McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (four J1ours)
with United States v. Perry, 449 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (one and one-half hours).
222. 406 U.S. at 684.
223. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).

March 1974]

Kirby, Biggers, and Ash

753

Court, though refusing to apply the sixth amendment to the states,
held that special circumstances could make the denial of counsel
fundamentally unfair in a particular case.224 Betts continues to be a
viable and important case even though Gideon overruled its sixth
amendment holding.225 Quite recently, in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,226
the Court held that, for sixth amendment purposes, probation and
parole revocation hearings could not be considered criminal prosecutions. Citing Betts, however, the Court provided a due process
right to counsel for those probationers and parolees incapable , of
effectively presenting and arguing their cases to the fact finder. 227
Without referring to Goldberg v. Kelly,2 28 the Court found due
process "not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in
informality, flexibility and economy must always be sacrificed."229
These "significant interests" may underlie the distinction between Goldberg's critical procedure approach and Gagnon's caseby-case approach. In revocation hearings, the need for counsel varies,
since "in most cases" the probationer or parolee has either been convicted of a new offense or admitted the alleged violations. 230 In such
cases counsel has little to investigate or argue. Second, counsel would
significantly change the revocation proceeding by making the fact
finder, who should have a "predictive and discretionary" role, more
akin to a trial judge.231 In his new quasi-judicial role, the fact finder
conceivably would become less tolerant of marginally deviant behavior;232 according to the Court at least, an absolute right to counsel
might adversely affect the probationer's or parolee's interests. Third,
an absolute right to counsel would impose a substantial financial
224. For a cogent criticism of Betts, see Kamisar, The Right to Caunsel and the
Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused,
30 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 1 (1962).
225. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
226. 411 U.S. 778 (1973). See also Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Gagnon
may be considered Kirby's counterpart on the other end of the sixth amendment's
right-to-counsel spectrum.
227. 411 U.S. at 788.
228. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See text accompanying notes 160, 166 supra.
229. 411 U.S. at 788. Some lower courts have recognized a special-circumstances
right to counsel in quasi-criminal and civil proceedings. See, e.g., Hudson v. Hardy,
412 F.2d 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (petitioner seeking declaratory judgment that he was
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in prison); United States ex rel. Marshall
v. Wilkins, 338 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1964) (habeas corpus); Dillon v. United States, 307
F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962) (motion to vacate sentence under what is now 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1970)). See also Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. R.Ev. 1027, 107!,
(1969).
230. 411 U.S. at 787.
231. 411 U.S. at 787.
232. 411 U.S. at 788.
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cost on the state.233 These considerations prompted the Court to
conclude that the need for counsel at revocation proceedings "derives
not from invariable attributes of those hearings, but rather from the
peculiarities of particular cases."234
While this more limited due process right would be preferable
to none at all, the differences between revocation hearings and pretrial identifications suggest that a more generalized due process approach would be appropriate. The need for counsel at pretrial
identifications derives from the invariable attributes of those procedures. The vagaries of eyewitness identification and the general sus•
ceptibility of witnesses to improper suggestion23 tl always make the
presence of counsel highly desirable. Also, the interests of the state
are reasonably fixed. If the analysis in the preceding section is correct, the state's interest in effective law enforcement might be adversely affected only by imposing the right to counsel at prompt onthe-scene identifications. Finally, as noted previously,286 the costs of
providing counsel at pretrial identifications would be negligible
both in an absolute sense and when weighed against the need to
prevent wrongful convictions.
A case-by-case approach would be inappropriate for a more practical reason. As witnessed by the flood of cases reaching the Supreme
Court after Betts, the special-circumstances test is particularly difficult to administer. 237 It requires the fact finder to make a decision
before all the complexities of the case and the full extent of the defendant's incapabilities become apparent. 238 The test increases ap233. 411 U.S. at 788. The Court estimated the number of revocation bearings at
about 130,000 per year. 411 U.S. at 788 n.11.
234. 411 U.S. at 789.
235. According to Wade, the potential for such suggestion, intentional or othenv1se,
is inherent in such procedures. See 388 U.S. at 228-29, 233, 236.
236. See text accompanying note 218 supra.
237. See Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54
MINN. L. REv. 1175, 1199-200, 1203-04 (1970); Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel
in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967).
238. This problem should readily become apparent as appellate courts wrestle with
Gagnon. The Court assumed that a simple issue, not usually requiring counsel, is
presented when the parolee has been convicted of a subsequent offense, See text ac•
companying note 230 supra. Suppose, however, that a counselless misdemeanor convic•
tion, which resulted merely in a fine, constitutes the basis of parole revocation, Under
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), a misdemeanant has a right to trial counsel
only if his conviction would actually result in a sentence of imprisonment. Standing
alone, the conviction seems constitutionally permissible, but the troublesome issue is
whether it can be used to justify parole revocation and thus indirectly result in a
sentence of imprisonment. To detect and argue that issue, it can be presumed that
most parolees would need counsel at the revocation hearing. It may also be question•
able whether the fact finder at the revocation hearing would recognize the issue and
the concomitant need for counsel. See generally J. GRANO, PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL PRO•
CEDURE 6, No. 7 (1974).
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pellate litigation, with the issue quite often not resolved until the
case reaches the Supreme Court.289 The difficulties would only be
aggravated by requiring the police, instead of a judge, to guess at
their hazard whether due process in a given case prohibits denial of
counsel. Nothing can be gained by seeking to protect the innocent
with rules that will only hamper and confuse the police.240 Therefore, once it is recognized that due process can sometimes require
counsel, simplicity of administration would suggest extending the
right to all cases.
If a special-circumstances test were adopted, courts would be
forced to provide guidelines for the police in case-by-case appellate
review. Presumably, the more extreme the improper suggestion, the
greater the risk of convicting the innocent and the greater the need
for counsel's assistance. 241 While prevention of improper suggestion
should constitute the primary consideration, courts would also have
to consider the defendant's capacity to detect the suggestion and the
possibility that counsel could remedy some of the harm with crossexamination at trial. Of course, this task would require judicial
speculation that, given current knowledge, simply could not be
supported with scientific evidence.
C.

The Rights of Confrontation and Effective Assistance of Counsel

Two other sixth amendment rights conceivably could support a
counsel requirement at precharge identification procedures: the right
to confront one's accusers and the right to have the "effective" assistance of counsel.242 Wade referred to both these rights by framing
its discussion in terms of whether counsel was "necessary to preserve
the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right
meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have
effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself."248 Later in the
239. For an example of the unfortunate results sometimes reached with this test,
see Kamisar, supra note 224, at 6 n.23.
240. Cf. Hammelmann &: Williams, Identification Parades-II, 1963 CRIM. L. REv.
(Eng.) 545, 547.
241. The suggestive techniques described above, see text accompanying notes 195201 supra, should at least establish a prima facie need for counsel's assistance.
242. The sixth amendment provides only for the "Assistance of Counsel." The Supreme Court first spoke of effective assistance in Powell v. ,Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 71
(1932), a due process, not a sixth amendment, case. Since Gideon, it has been assumed
that the sixth amendment also requires effective assistance. See generally Waltz, In-

adequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in
Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U. L. REv. 289 (1964); Comment, Incompetency and Inadequacy
of Counsel as a Basis for Relief in Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 20 Sw. L.J. 136
(1966).
243. 388 U.S. at 227.
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opinion, Wade specifically invoked the right of confrontation: "Insofar as the accused's conviction may rest on a courtroom identification
in fact the fruit of a suspect pretrial identification which the accused
is helpless to subject to effective scrutiny at trial, the accused is deprived of that right of cross-examination which is an essential safeguard to his right to confront the witnesses against him."244
At first glance, it appears that Kirby precludes using these rights
as a source for counsel in precharge identification cases. Both rights
are prefaced by the "criminal prosecution" language of the sixth
amendment,245 and Kirby's plurality held that a criminal prosecution does not commence until the start of formal judicial proceedings.246 Closer examination suggests a contrary conclusion. The issue
in Kirby was whether the sixth amendment right to counsel as such
could apply before the start of judicial proceedings. In Wade, on
the other hand, the Court spoke of protecting the rights of confrontation and counsel at trial. In other words, the sixth amendment
rights of confrontation and counsel at trial require certain pretrial
safeguards to guarant~e their effectiveness. In the absence of equally
adequate alternatives,247 the Court in Wade provided counsel's assistance as tlie primary safeguard.
The use of counsel as a pretrial safeguard for the right of confrontation was nothing new. Pointer v. Texas 248 first extended the
sixth amendment confrontation clause to the states. Applying this
clause, Pointer also prohibited the trial use of preliminary hearing
testimony given in the absence of defense counsel. Pointer indicated,
however, that a different case would have arisen if defense counsel
had been present at the preliminary hearing with a "complete and
adequate opportunity to cross-examine" the witness. 249 In effect,
therefore, Pointer established a limited pretrial right to counsel
as a procedural safeguard for the right of confrontation. Not until
six years later did the Court actually apply the right to counsel as
such to preliminary hearings. 250
244. 388 U.S. at 235.
245. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ••• to be con-

fronted with the witnesses against him ••. and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence." U.S. CoNST. amend. VJ.
246. 406 U.S. at 689.
247. 388 U.S. at 238-39. In suggesting that other safeguards might obviate the need
for counsel, Wade drew support from similar language in Miranda v. Atizona, 884 U.S.
486, 467 (1966). This again indicates that Wade's concern was not the sixth amendment
right to counsel as such.
248. 880 U.S. 400 (1965).
249. 880 U.S. at 407. Cf. California v. Green, 899 U.S. 149, 153-64 (1970).
250. Coleman v. Alabama, 899 U.S. I (1970).
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To the extent that Wade relied on the confrontation clause,251
it must be regarded as an extension of Pointer. Unlike the preliminary hearing witness in Pointer, the lineup witnesses in Wade testified
at trial and were submitted to extensive cross-examination. In Wade's
view, such cross-examination could not be effective without counsel's
presence at the previous lineup. Wade concluded that eyewitnesses
generally fail to detect subtle suggestion252 and rarely retract previous identifications.263 With these pre-existing handicaps, uninformed cross-examination could not effectively reconstruct the identification procedure or correct the result of improper suggestion.
This rationale, however, may have been recently undermined.
In California v. Green,254 the Supreme Court rejected prior California decisions and held that the prosecution could introduce a
witness's prior inconsistent statement given in the absence of defense counsel255 as substantive evidence against the accused. According to the California decisions, belated cross-examination at trial
violated the confrontation clause because it could not adequately
substitute for cross-examintion contemporaneous with the original,
inconsistent statement. In reasoning remarkably similar to Wade's,
the California court had concluded, in an earlier case, that such testimony, if false, was "apt to harden and become unyielding to the
blows of truth in proportion [to the witness's] opportunity for reconsideration and influence by the suggestions of others.''256 The
251. As the preceding text indicates, Wade somewhat ambiguously referred to the
due process right to a fair trial, the sixth amendment trial rights of confrontation and
effective assistance of counsel, and the sixth amendment right to counsel at certain
pretrial critical stages. Only meager authority has interpreted Wade as a confrontation
case. See, e.g., People v. Fowler, 1 Cal. 3d 335, 342-43, 461 P.2d 643, 649, 82 Cal. Rptr.
363, 369 (1969); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 356 Mass. 74, 82, 248 N.E.2d 253, 259 (1969).
See also Gilligan, supra note 170, at 198; Quinn, supra note 88, at 140 (commenting
that Wade recognized the interdependence of constitutional rights); Comment, supra
note 11, at 66 n.7.
·
252. 388 U.S. at 230.
253. 388 U.S. at 229.
254. 399 U.S. 149 (1970), revg. 70 Cal. 2d 654, 451 P.2d 422, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969).
255. In fact, the critical prior statements in Green were made in the presence of
defendant's counsel, with full opportunity to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing.
399 U.S. at 151. The Court concluded that this fact would have made the statements
admissible even had the witness been unavailable at the trial. 399 U.S. at 165. However,
the Court's discussion leaves little doubt that Green should not be limited to circumstances where there was opportunity for cross-examination at the time of the prior
statement: "[!']he inability to cross-examine the witness at the time he made his prior
statement cannot easily be shown to be of critical significance as long as the defendant
is assured of full and effective cross-examination at the time of trial." 399 U.S. at 159.
256. People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, 656, 441 P.2d 111, 118, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599,
606 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1051 (1969), quoting State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358,
362, 285 N.W. 898, 901 (1939). Accord, People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 451 P.2d 422, 75
Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969), revd., 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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Supreme Court disagreed on at least two grounds. First, the danger
of recalcitrance obviously does not exist when the witness repudiates
his ptior statement.257 Second, and perhaps more crucial, the defendant usually can expect favorable cross-examination when the out-of•
court statement is inconsistent with the witness's trial testimony.
The witness, presumably now hostile to the state, should be more
than willing to give an explanation for the "inaccuracy" of his prior
statement.268
·
If limited to prior inconsistent statements, Green would have
little effect on Wade's rationale. Cross-examination of a friendly
·witness about a prior inconsistent statement is, of course, distinguishable from cross-examination of a recalcitrant witness about a prior,
consistent, out-of-court identification. Green would have a more
devastating effect, however, if extended to prior consistent statements.259 An argument could then be made that, for purposes of
adequate cross-examination at trial, a prior consistent statement
cannot be distinguished from a prior consistent identification. Some
language in Green indicates that the Court would not have differentiated between prior consistent and inconsistent statements. The
Court commented, for example, that it had never excluded out-of.
court statements of a witness subject to cross-examination at trial. 200
Additionally, the Court interpreted the confrontation clause as
guaranteeing testimony under oath, cross-examination at trial, and
an opportunity for the jury to view the witness's demeanor. 201 Prior
consistent statements introduced as substantive evidence no more
thwart these functions than prior inconsistent statements. Under
oath and subject to cross-examination, the witness must still affirm,
deny, or explain the prior statement.
Even if Green is extended to justify the substantive use of prior
consistent statements, an argument could be made that eyewitness
testimony is sui generis, requiring special confrontation safeguards.
Wade adequately demonstrated that the suggestion inherent in identification procedures differs, both in kind and degree, from that involved in other pretrial contacts with witnesses. Moreover, with the
257. 399 U.S. at 159.
258. 399 U.S. at 160.
259. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1236 (West 1966), permits prior consistent statements to be
used as substantive evidence if the defendant opens the door by introducing a prior
inconsistent statement or evidence of the witness's bias or other improper motive. See
also FED. R. Ev. 80l(d)(l)(B) & Advisory Comm. Notes (proposed Nov. 20, 1972),
260. 399 U.S. at 161. But cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967),
261. 399 U.S. at 158. On the other hand, the Court refused to decide whether a
prior inconsistent statement could be admitted when the witness no longer remembered
the event in question. 399 U.S. at 168-70.
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possible exception of_ confessions, eyewitness identification testimony
constitutes the most decisive evidence in a criminal case. A mistake
in this testimony, as Borchard trenchantly documented,2 62 creates
the greatest risk of convicting the inn'ocent.263 Nevertheless, discretion should caution against undue reliance on the confrontation
clause as an independent source for a precharge right to counsel.
The due process clause, previously discussed, holds more promise.26 4The due process approach lacks the uncertainty associated with confrontation analysis and, more importantly, focuses on preventing,
not merely detecting, improper suggestion that leads to wrongful
convictions.
The confrontation and effective assistance of counsel arguments
are inextricably entwined: When counsel is denied meaningful
cross-examination, the defendant is denied the effective assistance
of counsel. The weaknesses in the former argument inevitably affect
the latter. In addition, the effective-assistance argument must hurdle
even more formidable obstacles. Most courts still refuse to label
representation as ineffective unless counsel reduces the trial to a
farce or a mockery of justice.265 Not surprisingly, few defendants
prevail on appeal in challenging trial counsel's representation. While
some courts have recently begun to retreat from this rigid position,2 66
it is reasonable to predict that most will avoid liberalizing this already fertile issue in appellate and postconviction proceedings. Without liberalization, the ineffective-assistance argument lacks the potency to protect the right to counsel at trial, let alone to create a
precharge right to counsel.
IV.

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: PHOTOGRAPHIC DISPL.AYS

A.

Ash267 and the Sixth Amendment

In August 1965, two men in stocking masks robbed a Washington, D.C., bank. Following the three or four minute robbery, the
witnesses could not describe the robbers' characteristics; they did,
262. See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
263. See Hammelmann & Williams, supra note 240, at 550: "Unfortunately, and
this is perhaps the crux of the matter, there seems to be an inclination not only
among the police but among judges and juries to accept the positive result of an identification parade more or less uncritically."
264. But cf. Note, Confrontation, Crolili-Examination, and the Right To Prepare a
Defense, 56 GEO L.J. 939, 941-55 (1968).
265. See Grano, supra note 237, at 1240-45; Waltz, supra note 242.
266. See, e.g., West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973); State v. Harper, 57
Wis. 2d 543, 205 N.W.l?d I (1973). See also ABA PROJEcr ON STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (1971).
267. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973), revg. 461 F.2d 92 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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however, describe the gunman as a tall, slim, young black. Five
months later, an FBI agent showed five black and white mug shots
to four witnesses, including two cashiers who had not observed the
robbers' faces; a customer who viewed the gunman a few seconds
before he donned his mask; and a woman who, seated in an automobile outside the bank, had had a "fleeting glimpse" of the escaping
robbers without their masks. All four witnesses, expressing some uncertainty, identified the defendant Ash as the gunman; one witness
also identified a codefendant, Bailey. Although a grand jury indicted
the defendants shortly thereafter, trial did not begin until May 1968.
On the day preceding trial, the prosecutor and an FBI agent displayed
five color photographs to three of the witnesses in the absence of defense counsel. All three identified Ash but none identified Bailey. On
the morning of trial, the agent showed the same pictures to the fourth
witness, who did not identify either defendant. The government did
not conduct a pretrial lineup.268
After conducting a pretrial suppression hearing, the trial judge
permitted the witnesses to make in-court identifications of the defendants. During the hearing, the government revealed that it could
not account for three of the five black and white mug shots originally
shmrn the witnesses. Only the defendants appeared full length in the
five color photographs; they were pictured next to a pole, possibly
a height marker, with police identification numbers. None of the
remaining color photographs bore identification numbers; one ended
at the subject's thigh, a second at the waist, and the third at the
lower chest. To the court of appeals on subsequent review, the tall
and slender defendants contrasted with the stocky men in the other
pictures.269
The government's case consisted of an informant, who implicated
Ash in the robbery,270 and the four eyewitnesses. While conceding
uncertainty caused by the stocking masks, both cashiers identified the
defendant Ash as resembling the gunman. The customer testified that
the defendant looked "sort of like" the gunman. The last witness,
the woman outside the bank, identified both defendants. When
Bailey's counsel on cross-examination demonstrated that this witness
268. 461 F.2d at 95-96. After making a tentative identification from the black and
white photos, one witness had asked to see the suspect in person. 461 F.2d at 95, 97.
269. 461 F.2d at 96-98.
270. The informant had an extensive criminal record and had appeared before a
grand jury with regard to five separate offenses, including a bank robbery. The United
States Attorney arranged to have the informant transferred from a District of Columbia
jail to one in :Rockville, Maryland, and helped the informant's wife to move to an
apartment near a parochial school for her children. 461 F.2d at 97 n,7. Cf. Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 313 (1966) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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had previously failed to identify Bailey from the color photographs,
the prosecutor, over Ash's objection, introduced the photographs
to show that the witness had identified Ash.271 The jury convicted
Ash but failed to.reach a verdict on Bailey.272 Ash appealed, arguing
that the postindictment photographic identification in the absence
of counsel violated his sixth amendment rights.
Splitting five to four, and rejecting the great weight of author~
ity,273 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held en bane that the defendant had a sixth amendment right to
counsel at the postcustody photographic display. Relying on Wade's
rationale, the court reasoned that photographic displays present the
same hazards, and therefore the same need for counsel's assistance,
as lineups.274 After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed,
limiting its discussion, as had the court of appeals, to the right-tocounsel issue.275
Although the Court remarked, apparently as an afterthought,
that photographic displays are not sufficiently "pernicious" to require
extraordinary safeguards,276 it did not otherwise attempt to refute
the lower court's discussion concerning the need for counsel. Rather,
the Court ruled that "lack of scientific precision and inability to
reconstruct an event are rrot the tests for requiring counsel in the
first instance."277 The threshold question, the Court added, is not
whether counsel can help, to guarantee a fair trial but whether the
defendant required counsel's assistance in a confrontation with the
procedural system or a skilled adversary.278 Since the defendant's
presence is a sine qua non of confrontations, the sixth amendment
271. 461 F.2d at 95-96.
272. 461 F.2d at 94-95.
273. See 413 U.S. at 301 & n.2. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Reed v. Anderson,
461 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1972), overruling United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1035 (3d Cir.
1970); United States v. Serio, 440 F.2d 827 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 838 (1971);
United States v. Ballard, 423 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d
888 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 852 (1969); McGee v. United States, 402 F.2d 434
(10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969); People v. Lawrence, 4 Cal. 3d 273,
481 P.2d 212, 93 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 909 (1972). But cf. Cox v.
State, 219 S.2d 762 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969); Thompson v. State, 85 Nev. 134, 451 P.2d 704,
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 893 (1969).
274. 461 F.2d at 99-105.
275. Both courts refused to decide whether the photographic display was so suggestive as to violate due process. 461 F.2d at 97-98, 413 U.S. at 321.
276. 413 U.S. at 321. The Court added this comment toward the end of its opinion,
after arguing at length that the sixth amendment applies only to personal confrontations between the accused and the state. See text accompanying notes 280-89 infra.
Without analysis, the Court found photographic procedures "hardly unique" in offering the prosecutor possibilities to subvert the trial. 413 U.S. at 320.
277. 413 U.S. at 316.
278. 413 U.S. at 315-17.
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right to counsel does not extend to procedures, such as photographic
displays, that do not personally involve the defendant. 270
Like Kirby, Ash turned to history and precedent to support its
formalistic and simplistic sixth amendment analysis. From history,
the Court gleaned that the primary purpose of the sL"tth amendment,
adopted in reaction to English common law procedures, was to provide counsel "at trial," when the accused "was confronted with both
the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor."280 As the criminal justice system became sophisticated, emerging
procedures forced the accused into pretrial confrontations with his
adversary. In response to these developments, Ash explained, the
Court extended the sixth amendment into certain aspects of pretrial
procedure. In Hamilton v. Alabama281 and White v. Maryland, 282
the Court extended the right to counsel to certain arraignments and
preliminary hearings, where the "accused was confronted with the
procedural system and was required, with definite consequences, to
enter a plea.''283 In Massiah v. United States,284 the Court extended
the right to counsel to postindictment, surreptitious interrogation
by an informant in a wired automobile while the defendant was free
on bail. In Ash's view, counsel in Massiah could have advised the
defendant of his fifth amendment rights and sheltered him from
governmental overreaching.285
Ash had no trouble with Coleman v. Alabama,280 which extended
the right to counsel to all preliminary hearings. Surely the prelimin279. 413 U.S. at 317.
280. 413 U.S. at 309. The common law did not recognize a right to counsel's as•
sistance during felony trials. For accounts of common law procedures, see W. DEANE1',
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 8-12 (1955); ]. GRANT, OUR COMIIION LAW
CoNSTITUTION 2-9 (1960); 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIIIIINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
319-427 (1883).
281. 368 U.S. 52 (1961). Hamilton provided counsel under the due process clause,
not the sixth amendment. CJ. Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957) {due process right
to be represented in person or by counsel at a hearing to settle the trial record for a
subsequent appeal).
282. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
283. 413 U.S. at 311.
284. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
285. 413 U.S. at 311. This, of course, is rather absurd. The defendant in Massiah
did not require fifth amendment protection since the informant did not compel him
to speak. Moreover, counsel's presence would not have assured assistance for the con•
frontation; rather, it would have prevented the confrontation from occurring. The
defendant would not have participated in the conversation had he known the actual
role of the government informant. Nevertheless, Ash cannot be faulted too severely
for its reading of Massiah. As previously discussed, see te.xt accompanying notes 96-98
supra, Massiah is an inexplicable case that probably should not have been decided on
right-to-counsel grounds.
286. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
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ary hearing can be characterized as a confrontation between the defendant and his more expertly skilled adversary. United States v.
Wade, 281 on the other hand, presented a substantial challenge. Ash
found little difficulty, however, in casting a new mold for Wade:
The function of counsel in rendering "Assistance" continued at the
lineup under consideration in Wade and its companion cases. Although the accused was not confronted there with legal questions,
the lineup offered opportunities for prosecuting authorities to take
advantage of the accused. Counsel was seen by the Court as being
more sensitive to, and aware of, suggestive influences than the accused
himself, and as better able to reconstruct the events at trial. Counsel
present at [the] lineup would be able to remove disabilities of the
accused in precisely the same fashion that counsel compensated for
the disabilities of the layman at trial.28 8
Some paragraphs later, with the malleable Wade decision no longer
an obstacle, the Court turned to photographic displays:
A substantial departure from the historical test would be necessary if
the Sixth Amendment were interpreted to give Ash a right to counsel
at the photographic identification in this case. Since the accused
himself is not present at the time of the photographic display, and
asserts no right to be present . . . no possibility arises that the accused might be misled by his lack of familiarity with the law or
overpowered by his professional adversary. Similarly, the counsel
guarantee would not be used to produce equality in a trial-like adversary confrontation. Rather, the guarantee was used by the Court
of Appeals to produce confrontation at an event that previously was
not analogous to an adversary trial.2so
In Ash's favor, the Court did correctly note the defendant's
presence at all stages where the right to counsel had previously been
extended. Beyond that, not much can be said in support of Ash's
analysis-or, more accurately, lack of analysis. The crucial question,
not really addressed by Ash, is why the defendant's presence should
matter. To say that the framers intended the sixth amendment to
guarantee counsel's assistance at trial does not provide a satisfactory
answer. The Court arguably moved beyond the framers' literal in287. 388 U.S. 218 (1967),
288. 413 U.S. at 312. A fe;v paragraphs later, the Court added:
Although Wade did discuss possibilities for suggestion and the difficulty for recon•
structing suggestivity, this discussion occurred only after the Court had concluded
. that the lineup constituted a trial-like confontation, req_uiring the "Assistance of
Counsel" to preserve the adversary process by compensatlllg for advantages of the
prosecuting authorities.••• The similarity to trial was apparent, and counsel was
needed to render "Assistance" in counterbalancing any "overreaching" by the
prosecution.
413 U.S. at 313.
289, 413 U.S. at 317.
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tent by recognizing the sixth amendment as a source of appointed
counsel for indigents200 and, as Ash acknowledged, by extending the
sixth amendment into pretrial stages. Ash itself recognized that the
evolution of criminal procedure from its embryonic, eighteenthcentury prototype made doctrinal modifications necessary to prevent
the sixth amendment from becoming an empty formalism, a result
certainly not intended by the framers. Rather than ignoring original
purposes, the Court demonstrated its commitment to the spirit of
the sixth amendment by applying the right to counsel to pretrial
stages that could "well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial
itself to a mere formality." 291 Having already charted a path to preserve the sixth amendment's effectiveness from the force of modem
developments, it is anomalous now to rely on historical facts that
bear little relation to the core purposes of the right to counsel. In
Wade's view, the plain wording of the sLxth amendment encompassed counsel's assistance "whenever necessary to assure a meaningful 'defense' " 292 or a fair trial. With the issue so stated, the accused's
presence should be no more crucial than the "at trial" limitation of
an earlier day. This should be especially so with respect to police
photographic procedures, which developed long after the sixth
amendment's adoption.
Ash overlooked some considerations that clearly suggest that the
Court erred in imposing a personal-confrontation limitation on the
sixth amendment. Voluntary absence293 or contumacious conduct29 '1
can cause a defendant to lose his right to be present at trial, yet no
one has suggested that such a defendant also loses his right to counsel.295 Since counsel invariably continues to represent the absent
defendant, the issue has not received appellate attention. Nevertheless, appellate decisions can be interpreted as recognizing sub silentio
the continuing right to counsel.296 Indeed, the point needs little
290. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), first recognized a sLxth amendment right
to appointed counsel. For an argument that Johnson ignored history, sec W. Il£AN£Y,
supra note 280, at 27-36.
291. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
292. 388 U.S. at 225 (emphasis added).
293. Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1978); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442
(1912).
294. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
295. Since the common law did not permit representation by counsel, the dcfcn•
dant's presence was necessary to guarantee at least the semblance of a fair trial. While
some authorities at first questioned whether the defendant could waive the right to
attend trial, most soon recognized that counsel could adequately protect the absent
defendant's rights. See Goldin, Presence of the Defendant at Rendition of the Verdict
in Felony Cases, 16 CoLUM. L. REv. 18 (1916).
296. Cf. Goitia v. United States, 409 F.2d 524 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
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elaboration; it would be unthinkable to prohibit the defendant's
attorney from proceeding with the defense.297 Of course, advocates
of Ash might argue that due process, rather than the sixth amendment, guarantees the absent defendant the continued assistance of
counsel, but nothing could be cited to support what would have
to be deemed a rather novel assertion. Further, such a contention
would immediately lead to a due process argument for the assistance
of counsel in photographic displays.
The defendant in Ash, as noted by the Court, did not assert the
right to attend the photographic display.298 This might appear to
provide an adequate sixth amendment basis for distinguishing
photographic displays from trials for absent defendants, who can
re-establish the right to be present by terminating their absence or
misbehavior. However, the right to counsel sometimes exists when
the defendant does not have the right to be personally present.
Some courts, for example, have attempted to protect the skyjacker
profile by excluding the defendant, but not his counsel, from segments of pretrial suppression hearings.299 More importantly, defendants on appeal have the right to counsel3°0 but very clearly do
not have the right to be personally present.801
Whether the sixth amendment constitutes the source-or, more
accurately, one of the sources-for the right to appellate counsel is
not altogther clear. In Johnson v. United States,802 a per curiam
opinion, the Court unanimously ruled that an indigent should be
provided appointed counsel to appeal a district court's certification
of lack of good faith, which precluded him from appealing in f?rma
906 (1970) (voluntary absence cost the defendant the right to change attorneys). See also
In re Hunt, 276 F. Supp. 112 (E.D. Mich. 1967), vacated sub nom. Hunt v. Arizona, 408
F.2d 1086 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 845 (1969).
297. Cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 351 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring): "[W]hen
a defendant is excluded from his trial, the court should make reasonable efforts to
enable him to communicate with his attorney ••.•" See also Murray, The Power To
Expel a Criminal Defendant from His Own Trial: A Comparative View, 36 U. CoLO.
L. R.Ev. l71, 175 (1964).
298. 413 U.S. at 317.
299. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972). Cf. Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97 (1934) (defendant, but not counsel, excluded from jury view of crime scene).
300. See text accompanying notes 302-12 infra.
301. Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442
(1892). See also Donnelly v. State, 26 N.J.L. 463, 472 (1857): "If a writ of error be sued
out and returned to this court in a case where the prisoner had no counsel ••• he
would have a right to appear personally in court, to have counsel assigned, or to
assign errors, and argue them in person. In such [a] case his presence would be clearly
a legal right." (Emphasis added,)
302, 352 U.S. 565 (1957).
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pauperis. 303 Johnson specifically relied on Johnson v. Zerbst,804 a
case squarely premised on the sixth amendment. Some years later,
Douglas v. California, 305 using an equal protection analysis, granted
state defendants the absolute right to appointed counsel on appeal.
Douglas's reference to Johnson v. United States as a federal right-tocounsel case 806 is rather inexplicable, since Gideon, 801 decided the
same day as Douglas, made the sixth amendment right to counsel
fully applicable to the states. If Johnson relied on the sixth amendment, 308 it and Gideon should have guaranteed state indigents the
right to appointed counsel on appeal, and Douglas should not have
found it necessary to open Pandora's box with an equal protection
analysis.309 Shortly thereafter, the Court, in Anders v. California,810
which restricted appellate counsel's ability to withdraw from an
appointment,311 added to the confusion by again suggesting a sixth
amendment basis for Johnson. Anders expressly adhered to the
principle of Johnson, described as a federal, appellate right-tocounsel case, and Gideon, described as the case that applied the
sixth amendment to the states.812 While Anders thus suggests that
Gideon extended Johnson to state appeals, the Court obfuscated the
matter with an extensive equal protection analysis.
If the sixth amendment can ever apply without a confrontation
between the defendant and the state, then Ash is dead wrong: Such
a confront_ation simply cannot constitute a necessary antecedent for
right-to-counsel analysis. Of course, Ash's proponents may argue that
303. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970), a convicted defendant can appeal. in forma
pauperis only if the trial court certifies that the appeal is taken in good faith. If the
trial court issues a bad-faith certificate, the indigent can appeal to the court of appeals
to overturn the certificate. Prior to Johnson, the indigent had to appeal without counsel
or a trial transcript. See generally Comment, Appellate Review for Indigent Criminal
Defendants, 26 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 454 (1959).
304. 304 U.S. 458 (1937) (sixth amendment requires appointment of trial counsel
for indigents in federal cases).
305. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
306. 372 U.S. at 357,
307. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
308. Substantial pre-Gideon authority interpreted Johnson as a sixth amendment
case. See Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 MINN. L, REV.
783, 786-87 (1961) (predicting Johnson's extension to state appeals); Comment, supra
note 303, at 458 (listing cases but taking a contrary view).
309. The broad ramifications of Douglas are analyzed in Kamisar &: Choper, The
Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations,
48 MINN. L. R.Ev. 1 (1963).
310. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
311. Anders required appointed counsel to accompany his request to withdraw with
a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. 886
U.S. at 744-45.
312. 386 U.S. at 741-42.
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the confrontation characteristic depends on the nature of the particular procedure, not on the defendant's presence, but this gambit
would also result in their checkmate. If the nature of the proceeding
is determinative, Ash erred in chastising the lower court for asserting
the need for counsel in photographic displays. Once the defendant's
presence is disregarded, the right to counsel should follow a fortiori
from Wade, unless photographic displays are inherently different
from lineups.
Justice Stewart repudiated the majority's reasoning; in a concurring opinion that used Wade's mode of analysis, he found counsel unnecessary to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial. 313
Justice Stewart argued that photographic displays lack the dynamic
qualities that make lineups particularly vulnerable to improper
suggestion.314 He then asserted that photographic displays are less
difficult than lineups to reconstruct at trial through cross-examination. 316 Last, Justice Stewart commented in passing that a photographic display is "far less indelible in its effect" upon a witness
than a lineup316-that is, a witness is more apt to retract an incorrect
photographic identification than an incorrect lineup· identification.
Justice Stewart's distinctions are all subject to challenge. First,
the potential for harmful suggestion in photographic displays should
not be underestimated. Ash itself is a poignant example: The witnesses described the robbers as tall and slim, yet only the defendants appeared full length, with police identification numbers,
in the photographic display. While overt, this improper suggestion
on the eve of trial conceivably could have induced the uncertain
witnesses to identify the defendant. 317 Moreover, Justice Stewart
underestimated the myriad possibilities of subtle suggestion. The
313. 413 U.S. at 321-25.
314. The accused is there in the flesh, three-dimensional and always full-length.
Further, he isn't merely there, he acts. He walks on stage, he blinks in the glare
of the lights, he turns and t111ists, often muttering aside to those sharing the spotlight. He can be required to utter significant words, to turn a profile or back, to
walk back and forth, to doff one costume and don another. All the while the po•
tentially identifying witness is watching, a prosecuting attorney and a police detective at his elbow, ready to record the witness' every word and reaction.
413 U.S. at 323, quoting United States v. Ash, 461 F.2d 92, 108 (1972) (Wilkey, J., dissenting). See also People v. Lawrence, 4 Cal. 3d 273, 481 P.2d 212, 93 Cal. Rptr. 204
(1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 909 (1972).
315. 413 U.S. at 324-25. See also United States ex rel, Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d
739 (3d Cir. 1972),
316. 413 U.S. at 325, quoting Unit~d States ex rel. Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d 739,
745 (3d Cir. 1972).
317. The photographs may be particularly suggestive if the defendant's appearance
has changed. See United States v. Collins, 416 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1025 (1970) (defendant lost seventy-five pounds between taking of photographs
and trial).
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Canadian experiment, described earlier,318 in which the defendant's
relative good looks biased the lineup, should admonish those who
disclaim belief in hidden persuaders. Obviously, a photographic
display of the men in the lineup would have been equally suggestive. Aside from the photographs themselves, the manner of their
presentation may be suggestive. As Justice Brennan stated in dissent, "the prosecutor's inflection, facial expressions, physical motions,
and myriad other almost imperceptible means of communication
might tend, intentionally or unintentionally, to compromise the
witness' objectivity."819
Second, photographic identifications are more difficult to reconstruct at trial than Justice Stewart assumed. Unlike lineups, the
photographs may be produced at trial, but this will not disclose
the suggestion in their presentation. In this respect, the photographs
are no more helpful than a still photograph of a lineup without
counsel.320 Moreover, it cannot be assumed that the witness in a
photographic identification ·will be superior to his lineup counterpart in detecting subtle suggestion. The defendant's absence, of
course, further decreases the likelihood of reproduction at trial.
Justice Stewart's analysis is most deficient on what should have
been the crux of the matter: the risk that the identification technique will contribute to the conviction of innocent defendants. This
risk depends, first, on the accuracy of the identification technique
and, second, on the likelihood that a witness will retract a previous
mistaken identification. Without attempting to measure these factors, Justice Stewart merely assumed that photographic displays are
more reliable than lineups. While empirical data is generally lacking, a recent experiment321 casts doubt on this assumption. In the
experiment college students viewed a movie depicting a department
store customer cashing a check. One hour later, the subjects, divided into three groups, were asked to identify the customer. One
group viewed monochromatic video tape sequences in which thirtythree inales walked, turned, repeated their names, counted to ten,
318. See text accompanying notes 204-06 supra.
319. 413 U.S. at 334.
320. But cf. People v. Lawrence, 4 Cal. 3d 273, 481 P.2d 212, 93 Cal. Rptr. 204
(1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 909 (1972) (police admitted showing photograph of simulated lineup to avoid the Wade counsel requirement; held, no right to counsel because,
among other things, photographic displays can adequately be reconstructed at trial).
See also United States v. Collins, 416 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1025 (1970) (witnesses identified defendant from photographs of lineup conducted in
presence of counsel for defendant).
321. Sussman, Sugarman &: Zavala, A Comparison of Three Media Used in Identification Procedures, in PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES, supra• note 109, at XI-I.
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and recited the months of the year. A second group viewed monochromatic slides depicting a full-length front view and a profile of
thirty-three males. The third group viewed similar slides, but in
color. The experimenters found that the subjects using the color
slides achieved significantly higher scores than those using the
monochromatic slides. No significant difference was found between
the subjects viewing the color slides and those using the moµochromatic video tape.322 The experimenters' comments warrant
special emphasis:
The implication is that even though the video was in black and
white, the dynamic cues offered by video improved identification as
much over black and white still photography as does [sic] color
still photography. In other words about an equal improvement in
identification was obtained by use of color as by use of dynamic
im~ery. This result is important because it suggests strongly that
color video may well yield additional improvement over still color
photography or even over black and white video.323

If dynamic cues enhance correct identifications, live, threedimensional lineups may be preferable to color video sequences.
At a minimum, the experiment indicates that lineups, being more
dynamic, should be regarded as a more accurate identification technique than photographic displays.324 Interestingly, Justice Stewart
pointed to the dynamic nature of lineups as a particular cause of
misidentifications.325 Since Wade and the available evidence amply
demonstrate the need for counsel at lineups, the need for counsel
at photographic displays should follow a fortiori, unless witnesses
in photographic identifications are more likely than lineup witnesses to retract their previous mistakes.
While no scientific evidence could be found concerning the
"freezing effect" of photographic identifications, many ·writers have
assumed, contrary to Justice Stewart, that witnesses are unlikely to
retract earlier photographic identifications.326 Neither side is con322. Id. at XI-6.
323. Id, at XI-7 (emphasis added). But cf. Laughery, Photograph Type and Cross
Racial Factors in Facial Identification, in PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES, supra note 109, at
V-1.

324. Accord, Comment, supra note 88, at 104.
325. 413 U.S. at 323.
326. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1968); N. SOBEL, supra note
11, at 90; Williams&: Hammelmann, supra note 177, at 484 ("[s]ubsequent identification
of the accused .•• shows nothing except that the picture was a good likeness"); Comment, Photographic Identification: The Hidden Persuader, 56 IowA L. REv. 408 (1970);
Comment, supra note 88, at 104.
Half a decade ago, the British Court of Criminal Appeals expressed sensitivity to
this danger:

770

1

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. '12:11'1

vincing without supportive empirical data. Nevertheless, since Wade
concluded that eyewitnesses rarely retract earlier lineup identifications,327 the burden of proof should be on those seeking to distinguish photographic displays. In the absence of such proof, counsel
should be required at photographic displays in order to prevent
improper suggestion that unnecessarily increases the risk of ,;vrongful
conviction.328
'
Both the majority and concurring opinions in Ash implied that
the right to counsel at photographic displays would ultimately result
in the sixth amendment's extension to all pretrial interviews of
prospective witnesses.329 However, these situations can be easily distinguished. First, the trend is to recognize a special hearsay exception for testimony referring to pretrial identifications.880 This
testimony obviously reinforces any in-court identification, thus
compounding the risk of ,;vrongful conviction in the event of
mistake.381 Except for impeachment purposes, most jurisdictions
exclude testimony concerning pretrial nonidentification interviews.332 Second, empirically confirmed deficiencies in human perception suggest the need for special safeguards with respect to
eyewitness identification testimony.838 Third, the probative effect
of identification testimony warrants precautionary measures to
guarantee, to the extent possible, its reliability. Mistakes in circumAnd where that process [photographic identification] has been gone through, no
matter with what care, it is quite evident that afterwards the witness who has so
acted in relation to a photograph is not a useful witness for the purpose of iden•
tification, or at any rate the evidence of that witness for the purpose of identifica•
tion is to be taken subject to this, that he has previously seen a photograph,
Rex v. Dwyer, [1925] 2 K.B. 799, 803 (Crim. App.). More recently, British courts have
modified Dwyer's inflexible position. See Rex v. Hinds, [1932] 2 K.B. 644, 647 (Crim.
App.); Rex v. Seiga, 45 Crim. App. 220 (1961), criticized in Williams &: Hammelmann,
supra, at 485-86. The Canadian cases take conflicting positions with respect to photo•
graphic identifications. Compare Rex v. Bagley, [1926] 3 D.L.R. 717 (B.C, Ct. App,)
(refusing to follow Dwyer literally) with Regina v. Sutton, [1970] 2 Ont, 358 (Ont. Ct,
App.) (following Dwyer and distinguishing Seiga).
327. 388 U.S. at 229, quoting Williams &: Hammelmann, supra note 177, at 482,
328. As previously discussed with respect to lineups, counsel is needed to prevent
unnecessary suggestion that may not violate due process under the Stovall test. Sec
text accompanying notes 195-202 supra, For a recent case refusing to follow Ash and
providing counsel as a matter of state law, see People v. Jackson, No. 54539 (Mich.,
April 16, 1974).
329. 413 U.S. at 317-18 (Blackmun, J.), 325 (Stewart, J., concurring).
330. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 n.3 (1967).
331. 461 F.2d at 101.
332. McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 601 (2d ed. Cleary 1972),
But see FED. R. Ev. 80l(d)(l) (proposed Nov. 20, 1972),
333. See text accompanying notes 105-26 supra.
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stantial evidence, though harmful, will usually be less decisive than
mistakes in identification testimony by a good-faith eyewitness.
In short, both the majority and concurring opinions in Ash
erred in every respect. Accepting Kirby's limitation, the sixth
amendment right to counsel should apply to all photographic displays conducted after formal judicial proceedings commence.

B. Postcustody Photographic Displays
Under Kirby, the sixth amendment cannot apply to photographic
displays conducted before the defendant is formally charged. The
possibility remains, however, that due process may require counsel's presence at precharge photographic identifications just as due
process may require counsel's presence at lineups.834 To resolve the
due process issue, the defendant's need for counsel must be balanced
against society's interests in proceeding without counsel.835 Since
the preceeding discussion concerning lineups and photographic displays has demonstrated the defendant's rather substantial need for
counsel's assistance, it only remains to consider the counterbalancing
factors.
The state's interests in not providing counsel are most substantial in precustody identifications. In Simmons v. United States,336
the Supreme Court stamped its imprimatur on photographic displays as an investigative tool of law enforcement. Quite often, in
fact, photo and mug shot identifications provide police with their
only investigative leads.837 A counsel requirement in these cases
would be most impractical, since representation would have to be
afforded each person whose picture is displayed.838 One lawyer could
conceivably be appointed to represent all the potential suspects, but
if he did not know whose interests to protect, the lawyer's effectiveness would be minimal at best.33 11
In some cases,840 circumstantial evidence points to the defendant,
334. See Parts lli(A)-(B) supra.
335. See text accompanying notes 166-68 supra.
336. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). The defendant in Simmons did not raise a right-to-counsel
issue, but instead challenged the photographic display as unnecessarily suggestive.
While recognizing the hazards of mistaken identification, the Court refused to prohibit the use of photographic displays in police work. 390 U.S. at 384. See Part V infra.
337. See Comment, supra note 88, at 104.
338. See Quinn, supra note 88, at 147-48.
339. See Comment, supra note 88, at 106, n.54: "In time, the representation of
anonymous suspects could become routine and less than adequate."
340. In Simmons itself the police traced a suspect car to the defendant's sister-in-law,
who claimed that she had loaned the car to her brother, a codefendant. 390 U.S. at 380.
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but the police need an identification to establish probable cause to
arrest. While an argument for counsel appears more persuasive in
these "focus" cases, the state's interests in withholding counsel
probably still predominate. First, the delay caused by providing
counsel could enable the suspect to escape the jurisdiction.841 Second, when the police have several suspects, representation would be
necessary for each. Third, problems of logistics and resources would
accompany any effort to provide counsel for suspects not yet arrested.
Even nonindigents would require appointed counsel, since the
police obviously could not afford to notify the suspect or his family. Finally, a focus approach would force the police to guess at their
peril which precustody cases require counsel.
The scales tip differently after the defendant is taken into custody. In fact, a case can be made for prohibiting photographic displays altogether when lineup procedures are'feasible.842 Nevertheless,
some authorities have defended both the postcustody use of photographic displays and the absence of counsel at such identifications.
They have argued that, when the defendant's place of custody is
far removed from potential witnesses, it would be unduly burdensome to bring the witnesses to the defendant or to require defense
counsel to travel with the police from one location to another. 343
The burden would be especially great where the police attempt to
connect the defendant with unsolved crimes.
Although these arguments are well taken, they are not alto•
gether persuasive. Wade itself recognized that substitute counsel
might sometimes be adequate to protect the defendant's interests. 844
Moreover, due process provides sufficient flexibility to avoid strait341. Simmons recognized this factor: "It was essential for the F.BI agents swiftly to
determine whether they were on the right track, so that they could properly deploy
their forces in Chicago and, if necessary, alert officials in other cities." 390 U.S. at 385.
342. See Part V infra. The pre-Ash cases that recognized a right to counsel at
photographic displays usually chastised the police for failing to conduct a lineup, See,
e.g., People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 188, 205 N.W.2d 461, 476 (1973).
343. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d 739, 744.45 (3d Cir.
1972). Cf. United States v. .Ballard, 423 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1970) (robbery in Mississippi,
arrest in Florida, photographic display at Tennessee service station). But cf. Re.\: v•
.Bagley, [1926) 3 D.L.R. 717, 719 (B.C. Ct. App.) (M:acDonald, C.J.A., dissenting) (these
factors outweighed by need to guarantee the defendant a fair trial).
344. 388 U.S. at 237 &: n.27. As Judge Hastie recently argued, "In these days when
criminal defender organizations abound and the bar generally is increasingly sensitive
to its obligation to assist in the defense of persons charged with crime, the recruitment
and assignment of substitute counsel for this. limited purpose will rarely be difficult or
burdensome." United States ex rel. Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d 739, 752 (3d Cir. 1972)
(dissenting opinion). The need for substitute counsel was amply demonstrated in
United States v• .Ballard, 423 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1970), described in note 343 s11pra.
One of three defendants appeared twice in the photo spread. Additionally, "Florida"
appeared on the front of the defendants' pictures.
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jacketing the police. For example, a procedure could be established
requiring judicial approval of postcustody photographic displays
without counsel. Such authorization would serve primarily to as·sure the necessity for proceeding in counsel's absence.345 Judicial
authorization would also provide an opportunity to review the
photographs for improper suggestion before their use.
To summarize, Ash erred both in its sixth amendment analysis
and in its evaluation of the risks that attend photographic displays. •
The sixth amendment should provide a right to counsel at all postcharge photographic identifications. A due process analysis should
be applied to all other cases. While such an analysis would permit
precustody photographic displays without counsel, it would require
counsel in postcustody cases. To avoid rigidity, postcustody procedures without counsel may ocasionally be used, but, in order to
protect adequately the interest in avoiding mistaken identifications,
such procedures should require prior judicial authorization.
V.

DUE PROCESS: PROHIBITING UNNECESSARY SUGGESTIVE
PROCEDURES

A. Neil v. Biggers:846 A New Retroactivity Doctrine?
On January 22, 1965, a young man with a butcher knife grabbed
Mrs. Beamer in her kitchen doorway, which was illuminated only by
light emanating from a nearby bedroom. After threatening to kill
Mrs. Beamer and her twelve year old daughter, the assailant walked
his victim at knifepoint two blocks to a moonlit wooded area and
raped her. The entire incident occurred within fifteen minutes to
half an hour. According to trial testimony, Mrs. Beamer described
the assailant as "fat and flabby with smooth skin, bushy hair and a
youthful voice"; according to subsequent habeas corpus testimony,
she also described the assailant as sixteen to eighteen years old,
close to two hundred pounds, and six feet tall. During the seven
months following the rape, Mrs. Beamer viewed several lineups,
showups, and photographic displays without identifying anyone.347
On August 17, the police summoned her to the station to "look at
345. Some commentators have recommended that the police limit photographic
identifications to the fewest possible witnesses even before the defendant's arrest.
Hammelmann &: Williams, supra note 240, at 553. Quite often the prosecutor's needs
can be satisfied by contacting just some of the potential witnesses; with respect to the
others, the prosecutor frequently can afford to wait until an identification procedure
with counsel becomes convenient. See Simmons'v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 386 n.6
(1968).
346. 409 U.S. 188 (1972), Tevg. 448 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1971).
347. 409 U.S.' at 194-95.
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a suspect."348 When she arrived, two detectives, in the presence of
three other police officers,849 paraded the defendant by her and directed· him to say "[s]hut up or I'll kill you." Mrs. Beamer identified
the defendant as the rapist, but the record left doubt as to whether
she waited for him to speak.s5o
The defendant's subsequent conviction, based almost exclusively
on Mrs. Beamer's identification, was affirmed by the Tennessee
Supreme Court.851 After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court
affirmed by an equally divided vote, with Justice Douglas arguing
in the only expressed opinion that the shm\Tllp violated due process.852 Thereafter, the defendant petitioned for federal habeas
corpus relief; after holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court
found the showup unnecessarily suggestive and ordered the defendant's retrial or release.853 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding
that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous.8 1i-1 The
Supreme Court again granted certiorari and, after argument, reversed the nvo lower federal courts.855
The showup and trial in Biggers preceded the Supreme Court's
decision in Stovall v. Denno.856 Like Biggers, Stovall involved a oneman showup. Five police officers and nvo prosecutors, all white,
brought the handcuffed defendant, a black, into a hospital room to
be viewed by a white doctor who had just undergone major surgery
for multiple stab wounds suffered during an unsuccessful attempt
to rescue her husband from a fatal assault. The doctor identified
the defendant at the hospital and again during the subsequent trial,
at which defendant was convicted.857 The New York Court of
.348. 448 F.2d at 9.3 .
.349. 448 F.2d at 106 (Brooks, J., dissenting) •
.350. 409 U.S. at 195•
.351. Biggers v. State, 219 Tenn. 553, 411 S.W.2d 696 (1967) .
.352. Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404 (1968).
35.3. The opinion of the court of appeals contains substantial portions of the un•
reported district court opinion. 448 F.2d at 93-96.
354. 448 F.2d at 95.
355. The Supreme Court first held that its prior affirmance by an equally divided
vote did not preclude subsequent habeas corpus relief on the same issue. 409 U.S. at
193. See generally Casenote, 6 IND. L. REv. 840 (197.3). The Court next declined the invitation to avoid the merits because of the "two-court" rule, According to the dissent, the
majority departed from the "long-established practice" of not reversing fact-findings of
two lower courts unless clearly erroneous. See 409 U.S. at 201-04 (Brennan, J., joined
by Stewart & Douglas, JJ., dissenting). For commentary on this aspect of the opinion,
see Casenote, 7.3 CoLUM, L. REv. 1168, 1175-77 (1973).
356. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
357. 388 U.S. at 295.
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Appeals affirmed without opinion.358 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari following the denial of habeas corpus relief. The Court
first denied retroactively to the Wade-Gilbert right-to-counsel
rules.359 But, establishing a new constitutional challenge to identification evidence, the Court also considered whether the showup "was
so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification that [the defendant] was denied due process of law."360
Appraising the totality of the circumstances, including the need for
a prompt identification because of doubts concerning the doctor's
survival, the Court found no constitutional infirmity.861
One year later, Simmons v. United States8 62 provided further
insight into the analysis required by Stovall's due process test. In
Simmons, FBI agents displayed six snapshots, mainly group photographs of the defendant, a codefendant, and others, to five bank
employees the day after a robbery. Since the photo display preceded
Wade and Gilbert, the defendant limited his argument to a due
process challenge.863 Because the FBI agents had not yet apprehended the robbers when they conducted the display, the Court
found the need for a prompt identification "hardly less compelling"
than the justification for the showup in Stovall.364 While recognizing that the particular display fell "short of the ideal," the Court
also found little danger of misidentification: The witnesses had observed the robbers in a well-lit bank, had viewed the snapshots individually, and had not recognized the codefendant, who appeared
equally prominent in the pictures. The Court did recognize that
the police may abuse photographic displays, but it refused to prohibit such displays altogether, either under its supervisory power
or as a matter of constitutional law.365
858. 18 N.Y.2d 1178, 197 N.E.2d 548, 248 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1964).
859. 388 U.S. at 296.
860. 888 U.S. at 801-02.
861. "Faced with the responsibility of identifying the attacker, with the need for
immediate action and with the knowledge that [the doctor] could not visit the jail,
the police followed the only feasible procedure and took Stovall to the hospital room.
Under these circumstances, the usual police station line-up, which Stovall now argues
he should have had, was out of the question." 888 U.S. at 302.
862. 890 U.S. 377 (1968). See also Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969) (the only Supreme Court case to find a Stovall violation); Coleman v. Alabama, 899 U.S. 1 (1970).
363. The Court first rephrased the test by stating the issue as whether the display
"was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification." 390 U.S. at 884. Compare the Stovall test set out in text
accompanying note 360 supra.
364. 890 U.S. at 385.
365. 390 U.S. at 384-86.
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The federal district court in Biggers distinguished Stovall and
Simmons. Finding neither a death-bed emergency nor other reasons
for an immediate showup, the district court rebuked the police
for not conducting a lineup:
True, it may have been more convenient for the police to have a
show-up. However, in matters of constitutional due process where
police convenience is balanced against the need to extend basic fairness to the suspect in a criminal case, the latter should always outweigh the former. In this case it appears to the Court that a line-up,
which both sides admit is generally more reliable than a show-up,
could have been arranged. The fact that this was not done tended
needlessly to decrease the fairness of the identification process to
which petitioner was subjected.366
The Supreme Court disagreed. From its reading of precedent,
the Court viewed the likelihood of misidentification as the primary
concern of the due process challenge.867 It faulted the district court
for focusing unduly on the relative reliability of lineups and showups instead of examining the totality of circumstances for the likelihood of misidentification. Rather bewilderingly, the Court then
added a paragraph that will only rekindle the hopes of those who
champion the district court's more expansive due process analysis:
The purpose of a strict rule barring evidence of unnecessarily suggestive confrontations would be to deter the police from using a less
reliable procedure where a more reliable one may be available, not
because in every instance the admission of evidence of such a confrontation offends due process .... Such a rule would have no place
in the present case, since both the confrontation and the trial preceded Stovall v. Denno ..• when we first gave notice that the suggestiveness of confrontation procedures was anything other than a
matter to be argued to the jury.sos
This language carries the distinct flavor of the Court's retroactivity decisions369 and suggests that the district court may have
erred only in applying its analysis to a pre-Stovall fact situation. 37°
If this interpretation is accurate, the paragraph raises some intriguing questions. In the typical retroactivity case, the Court decides whether a specific constitutional decision can be used to
366. 448 F.2d at 94-95 (quoting unreported district court opinion),
367. 409 U.S. at 198. In fact, the Court added, Stovall explicitly indicated that a
one-man showup does not in itself violate due process. 409 U.S. at 198.
368. 409 U.S. at 199.
369. See cases cited in note 18 suftra.
370. See Smith v. Coiner, 473 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1973) (alternative holding). But cf,
Stanley v. Cox, 486 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Evans, 484 F.2d 1178 (2d
Cir. 1973).
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invalidate prior convictions. In Biggers, however, the Court was
not concerned with Stovall's retroactivity; Stovall itself had settled
that issue by holding that the due process clause is the exclusive
constitutional safeguard for defendants whose lineups or showups
preceded the nonretroactive Wade and Gilbert decisions. Biggers
instead implied that the Stovall principle, although retroactive,
should be interpreted one way with respect to pre-Stovall confrontations and quite another way thereafter. This must be viewed as a
new chapter in retroactivity law.
The novelty of this doctrine· can better be appreciated by comparing the Court's retroactivity approach in the confession area. In
Johnson v. New Jersey, 871 the Court refused to give retroactive application to Escobedo and Miranda. Like Stovall, Johnson attempted
to make its decision more palatable by emphasizing the availability
of a due process challenge for pre-Escobedo and Miranda defendants.
Unlike Biggers, however, Johnson expressly indicated that the most
recent due process refinement would apply to any defendant, regardless of when he was convicted.872 For example, any defendant
could invoke the Escobedo and Miranda safeguards as factors tending to show the involuntariness of his confession.
Why different retroactivity approaches should govern these respective areas is not altogether clear. Generally, retroactivity depends upon three factors: (1) the effect of the new rule on the
reliability or integrity of the fact-finding process, (2) the extent of
law enforcement reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect of
retroactivity on the administration of justice.878 The second and
third factors are important when the first is not decisive. The due
process confession cases were not primarily concerned with the reliability of confessions. Even before Escobedo and Miranda, the
confession's reliability had ceased to be a relevant consideration
under due process analysis.874 In contrast, unnecessarily suggestive
371. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
372. 384 U.S. at 730. But cf. Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 50-57 (1973), decided
after Biggers, denying retroactive application to a prophylactic due process rule requiring a judge to state reasons for imposing a heavier sentence after a retrial following
a successful appeal.
373. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969); Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293 (1967). The three-pronged test does not apply in all situations. See Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507-09 (1973) (three-pronged test not applicable regarding
retroactivity of double jeopardy decision).
374. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 518 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
534, 541 (1961); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 64-68 (1951). See also, Kamisar, What
Is an "Involuntary Confession": Some Reflections on lnbau and Reid's "Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions," 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 728 (1963); Mishkin, The Supreme
Court, 1964 Term-Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process
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identification procedures do add to the risk of ·wrongful convictions,
as the district court in Biggers observed. Moreover, law enforcement
officials certainly no more anticipated the expansive due process confession rulings in the 1950's and 1960's than the Stovall rule in
1967.375
Nevertheless, the different retroactivity approaches can be defended. Due process analysis has generally focused on the fairness
of trial, 376 but Stovall directed its concern at the identification procedure in isolation.377 This represented an important shift in emphasis, for at least some critics would argue that a defendant can
receive a fair trial even though some unreliable identification evidence is admitted.378 Prior to Stovall, however, only one Court had
Clause of Time and Law, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56 (1965); Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliabil•
ity and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CHI, L. REv. 719, 725-27
(1966).
375. See L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR, w. LAFAVE &: J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMlNAL PROCEDURE
607 (3d ed. 1969).
376. Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230, 1250-51 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 694 (1969) (Leventhal, J., concurring). Cf. Rochin v, California, 342 U.S. 165,
169 (1952) (Court must examine "the whole course of the proceedings"); Adamson v,
California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
377. Of course, the harmless-error rule would preclude reversal in some cases, See
Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230, 1250-51 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 694 (1969) (Leventhal, J., concurring).
378. Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert, denied, 39'1
U.S. 694 (1969). In rebuttal, some may note that the due process confession cases focused
on the interrogation process rather than on the fairness or reliability of trial. While
this is true, the two areas are not really analogous. The privilege against self•incrim•
ination constitutes a rich part of our common law heritage. Although it took almost
tlvo centuries to extend the fifth amendment to the states and into the police station,
see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. l (1964), fifth amendment notions always influenced due
process analysis in confession cases. The concern with preserving an accusatorial procedure as the mainstay of our criminal justice system and the general abhorrence of
coerced confessions (which quickly conjure up memories of the rack and screw), see,
e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 376 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1961), make the retroactive application of the confession cases easier to comprehend. Moreover, law enforcement officials
have long been aware that due process, whether interpreted liberally or not, precludes
the use of involuntary confessions, for such confessions had been a ground for reversal
of a state conviction as early as 1936. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
This does not fully e.xplain the retroactivity of the confession cases. Miranda, a fifth
amendment confession case, was not applied retroactively. See text accompanying notes
371-72 supra. Moreover, in Tehan v. United States ex rel, Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966),
the Court denied retroactivity to Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), which pre•
duded comment on the accused's failure to testify at trial. Perhaps, however, the denial
of retroactivity to Miranda and Griffin reflects some doubt about the seriousness of the
fifth amendment concerns in those cases. The "compulsion" from failing to give
constitutional warnings is far different from the compulsion found in the earlier confession cases. To a large extent, Miranda can be viewed as establishing prophylactic
safeguards against the possibility of compulsion. See Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47
(1973). Moreover, not everyone would agree that comment on the failure to testify
should be equated with compulsion. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 617-23
(1965) (Stewart, J., joined by White, J., dissenting); s. HOOK, CoMMON SENSE AND THE
FIFI'H AMENDMENT (1957). The Court has never clearly articulated a reason for the
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suggested a due process exclusionary rule for identification evidence.879 Since the police had no reason to anticipate the invalidity
of one-man showups, the retroactive application of an expanded
Stovall rule could result in the release of untold prisoners. This
might be considered an unreasonably high price to pay for an unknown quantum of improvement in fact-finding reliability.
Putting aside these general retroactivity considerations, the Supreme Court did not adequately consider whether the district court,
in fact, expanded the Stovall-Simmons due process test. Once again,
conflicting vie·wpoints are possible. Stovall suggested a preference
for lineups over showups, except in emergency situations,380 and
Simmons condoned precustody photographic displays, despite the
risks of improper suggestion, partly because of their usefulness to
law enforcement.881 Therefore, neither case provides much support
for a one-man showup seven months after the crime. Such an identification procedure can readily be described as "unnecessarily" or
"impermissibly" suggestive. Nevertheless, both the Court's factual
analysis and its restatement of the due process test in Simmons382
stressed the substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification as
a crucial factor. While the district court referred to this factor in
passing, it directed the primary thrust of its opinion at the failure
to hold a lineup. If permitted to stand, the district court's decision
would have established, in effect, a per se rule excluding identification evidence whenever the police unnecessarily substitute a showup
for a lineup.
In summary, the Supreme Court did not clearly err eithe:r in
assessing the practical import of the district court's opinion or in
fashioning a new "retroactivity" doctrine. What remains is to
consider whether the district court's more expansive due process
approach would be appropriate in post-Stovall, or at least postBiggers,888 cases.
retroactivity of its due process confession cases. Compare Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 638 (1965) with Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 250 & n.15 (1969). See also
Schwartz, supra note 374, at 747-52.
379. Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966). Cf. Michigan v. Payne, 412
U.S. 47, 56-57 (1973) (lower courts had no reason to anticipate prophylactic due process
rule concerning increased sentences on retrial after appeal).
380. See text accompanying notes 360-61 supra.
381. See text accompanying note 365 supra.
382. See note 363 supra.
383. Arguably, Biggers is the first Supreme Court case even to suggest a per se
prophylactic approach. If so, retroactivity would more appropriately be measured from
Biggers, not Stovall. For a discussion of the problem in determining the "newness" of a
constitutional ruling, see Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 263-68 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
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B. Prohibiting Unnecessarily Suggestive Procedures

The Stovall-Simmons totality-of-circumstances test requires a
case-by-case evaluation of identification procedures. This approach
has several shortcomings. First, it leaves the police with too much
discretion. The lack of guiding rules or standards384 not only fails
adequately to protect the innocent from improper suggestion, but
also works, ultimately, to impede confident and effective law enforcement. Under the current approach, courts often reverse convictions because of suggestive identification techniques without
providing a simple, intelligible rule to guide future police conduct. 385 Such- unresponsive court action inevitably undermines
police morale by reinforcing the already popular notion that law
enforcement is constantly being hampered by rules designed only
to protect the guilty.386 Second, the Stovall-Simmons test manifests
an unrealistic and naive faith in the willingness of trial and appellate courts to rectify errors in identification procedures.387 This
criticism implies no disrespect for the judiciary; it merely suggests
that our rules should comport with psychological realities. Those
closely associated with prosecutors and appellate courts must be
aware of the potent, almost indomitable psychological pressure to
find means for preserving convictions, particularly in ugly cases. 888
Because that pressure is so compelling, the Supreme Court should
have anticipated that courts generally would use every conceivable
method to avoid finding due process violations except in the most
outrageous situations.889
Biggers demonstrates the unsoundness of the present approach.
Within half an hour, the victim was assaulted from behind in a
dimly lit hallway, wrestled to the floor, forced to walk two blocks
-the rapist behind her-and raped in a moonlit woods. 800 The vie384-. See Comment,' Regulation and Enforcement of .Pre-Trial Identification Proce•
dures, 69 COLUM. L REv. 1296, 1299-300 (1969).
385. For similar problems with respect to search and seizure law, see LaFave &:
Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and ReViewing lAw
Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REv. 987, 1002-08 (1965); LaFave, Improving Police
Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule (pts. 1-2), 30 Mo. L. REv. 391, 566 (1965).
386. See J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 214 (1966).
387. See Comment, supra note 384-, at 1300; Note, supra note 20.
388. Cf. Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel: Spinelli-Harris Search Wan-ants
and the Possibility of Police Perjury, 1971 U. ILL. LF. 405, 410-11 (1971) (discussing the
psychological pressure on police to commit perjury and on prosecutors to distort facts
in "prep" sessions with witnesses).
389. See Note, supra note 20, at 818; Note, Mandatory Exclusion of Identifications
Resulting From Suggestive Confrontations: A Conceptual Alternative to the Indepen•
dent Basis Test, 53 B.U. L REv. 433, 442 (1973).
390. See text accompanying notes 346-50.
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tim's twelve year old daughter, who also observed the rapist in the
hallway, could not identify the defendant. To the district court,
these facts proved the victim "did not get an opportunity to obtain
a good view of the suspect during the commission of the crime,"891
but, to the Supreme Court, the same facts disclosed two opportunities to face the rapist "directly and intimately" under "adequate
artificial light" and a "full moon." 392 Relying on trial testimony, the
district court concluded that the victim had not provided the
police with a "good physical description" of the assailant; 893 relying
on habeas corpus testimony four years after trial, the Supreme Court
characterized the victim's description as "more than· ordinarily
thorough." 894 Influenced in part by the seven-month delay, the district court ruled the one-man showup "so suggestive as to enhance
the chance of misidentification"; 395 "[w]eighing all the factors," the
Supreme Court found "no substantial likelihood of misidentification."896 Although the court of appeals upheld the district court's
fact findings,397 the Supreme Court found them "clearly erroneous."sos
Biggers at least partially reflects the psychological pressure to
affirm convictions. The Court commented that a rape victim, typically the only available witness, "often has a limited opportunity
of observation." 399 This statement, combined with the Court's
somewhat strained factual analysis, suggests that the interest in obtaining and preserving convictions justifies less than rigorous afterthe-fact review of pretrial identification techniques. Unfortunately,
Biggers also reflects the degree of inconsistency in lower court decisions since Stovall. 400
Quite obviously, the chaotic due process decisions neither sufficiently protect against mistaken identifications nor adequately develop guidelines for law enforcement. An approach yielding concrete
standards would be preferable from everyone's perspective.401
391. Biggers v. Neil, 448 F.2d 91, 94 (6th Cir. 1971), revd., 409 U.S. 188 (1972)
(quoting unreported district court opinion).
392, 402 U.S. at 200 (1972). See also Casenote, supra note 355, at 1178.
393. 448 F.2d at 94.
394. 409 U.S. at 200. See also Casenote, supra note 355, at 1178-79.
395. 448 F.2d at 95.
396. 409 U.S. at 201.
397. 448 F.2d at 95.
398. 409 U.S. at 200.
399. 409 U.S. at 201.
400. See generally Note, supra note 20; Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 791 (1971).
401. At the outset, however, the questions of right and remedy should be divorced.
Dependence upon the exclusionary rule as the exclusive remedy understandably induces
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Development of concrete standards is facilitated by focusing on
the identification technique, rather than on the likelihood of mistaken identification in a given case. Biggers actually provides the
:rationale for a prophylactic approach directed at the identification
procedure: "Suggestive confrontations are disapproved because they
increase the likelihood of misidentification, and unnecessarily suggestive ones are condemned for the further reason that the increased
chance of misidentification is gratuitous."402 This sentence concisely
states the whole argument. While reasonable men may disagree over
the degree of prejudice, all must concede that the sho·wup in Biggers
somewhat increased the risk of wrongful conviction. The increased
risk, as even the Supreme Court agreed, was totally unnecessary and
"gratuitous." Surely a system historically dedicated to protecting
the innocent from wrongful conviction cannot tolerate such gratuitous risks.
An expanded, prophylactic due process approach, therefore,
builds on the premise that the police must always employ the more
reliable of two available identification techniques. The less reliable
method must be prohibited because it gratuitously increases the
risk of misidentification. From this it follows, as the district court
in Biggers observed, that lineups, when feasible, should always be
preferred over one-man showups. The presentation of a single
suspect to a witness or victim undoubtedly constitutes the most suggestive identification procedure available to the police.403 Typically,
as in Kirby and Biggers, the witness's knowledge that a suspect has
been apprehended aggravates the risk of improper suggestion. Since
the technique itself is inherently suggestive, even counsel's assistance
would generally ·be of little avail. 404 Unlike lineups, showups fail
to provide independent verification of the witness's ability to identify the offender. A yes-no procedure is much more conducive to
unchecked guessing than a procedure that requires the witness to
choose from several potential defendants.406
The practice of conducting prompt on-the-scene identifications
reluctance to adopt more rigid substantive standards. The present discussion, therefore,
will concentrate only on the development of substantive safeguards, postponing the
remedy question to a subsequent section. See Part VII infra. This should permit reflec•
tion and evaluation without the negative bias occasioned by the exclusionary rule,
402. 409 U.S. at 198. Cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (due process
prophylactic procedure adopted as safeguard against unfair resentencing on retrial
after a successful appeal).
403. P. WALL, supra note 26, at 27-40.
404. Of course, counsel could prevent other abuses that increase the suggestion
inherent in showups. For a description of these abuses, see id. at 29·33,
405. See Casenote, supra note 355, at 1180.
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makes some one-man shmrups inevitable. These shmrups, however,
are justified only by the apparently overriding law-enforcement need
to maintain this investigative procedure. Once the need for promptness evaporates, no interest can justify the failure to conduct an
in-person lineup. 406 If a prophylactic rule generally prohibiting oneman shmrups is adopted, the promptness issue will continue to arise,
perhaps ·with greater frequency, in trial and appellate litigation.
Nevertheless, stringent, inflexible time limitations are unwise given
the myriad fact situations that occur on the street. Each jurisdiction, either judicially, legislatively, or, preferably, administratively,
should promulgate rules and regulations to fill the constitutional
interstices.407 Police conduct that conforms to reasonable, publicized
regulations consistent with broad constitutional guidelines should
generally receive favorable judicial review.
The use of photographic displays in place of lineups raises several issues. As previously discussed, empirical research indicates that
lineups assure more reliable identification than photographic displays.408 Unlike lineups, two-dimensional photographs do not reveal
mannerisms, demeanor, or speech. Moreover, the frozen image presented by a photograph may differ significantly from the live, moving
subject.400 Since a ,;\Titness usually has a greater opportunity to study
photographs than to observe the offender during the crime, the
danger subsequently arises that he or she, whether at a corporeal
lineup or at trial, may identify the person previo~sly chosen rather
than the actual offender.410 In view of these deficiencies, postcustody
photographic displays should generally be prohibited. The need for
a prophylactic rule is especially apparent now that Ash, by denying
406. See text accompanying notes 129-34, 219-22 supra.
407. Rule-making is gradually being recognized as an acceptable method of filling
constitutional interstices. See, e.g., ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE,
§ A5.09 (Study Draft No. 1, 1968) (proposing statutory standards and complementary
local regulations, to be issued by law enforcement agencies). Cf. ALI MoDEL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, pt. II (Official Draft No. 1, 1972) (proposing search and
seizure standards); AruzoNA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW, PROJECI' ON LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND RULEMAKING, MODEL RULES: W ARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF PERSONS
AND PLACES (1973). See generally Goldstein, Police Policy Formation: A Proposal for
Improving Police Performance, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1123 (1967); McGowan, Rule-Making
and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REv. 659 (1972). The Supreme Court could perhaps require
the adoption of local regulations. Cf. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (requiring
states to adopt certain procedures to evaluate the voluntariness of confessions).
408. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 321-24 supra.
409. See text accompanying notes 321-24 supra. See also People v. Lawrence, 4 Cal.
3'd 273, 283-84, 481 P.2d 212, 219-20, 93 Cal. Rptr. 204, 211-12 (1971) (Sullivan, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 909 (1972): N. SoBEL, supra note 11, at 7; P. WAU., supra
note 26, at 70; Comment, supra note 88, at 104.
410. See N. SOBEL, supra note 11, at 7; P. WAU., supra note 26, at 70; Williams &:
Hammelmann, supra note 177, at 484; Comment, supra note 88, at 104.
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the right to counsel at photographic displays, has given the police
a further incentive to avoid postcharge lineups, where Wade's counsel requirement still applies. 411 A prohibition on postcustody photographic displays will have the additional salutary effect of precluding
attempts to "freeze" or shore up previous uncertain identifications
or to prompt witnesses immediately before trial. 412 An exception
to the general prohibitionary rule will be necessary for those occasions when a lineup is impractical-for example, where witnesses
are ill or far removed from the defendant's place of custody or where
suitable nonsuspect lineup participants are not available.418 In these
rare cases, the previously advocated reconsideration of Ash414 would
help to minimize the risk.
As Simmons recognized,415 precustody photographic displays are
essential to law enforcement despite their dangers. Even here, some
limitations may be warranted. Probable cause to arrest does not require that each potential witness identify the offender; quite often
the police can wait until the defendant's arrest to obtain identifications from most of the witnesses.416 Again, however, the great potential for variant factual complexities cautions against inflexible
constitutional rules that might hamper the police.417 Each jurisdiction should instead ensure informed police judgment by adopting
administrative regulations.
Each jurisdiction should also promulgate rules to govern the conduct of identification procedures.418 These rules, for example, would
require a minimum number of nonsuspect lineup participants to minimize the possibility of chance identification. These rules might also
preclude the supervising officers and nonsuspect participants from
411. See State v. Wallace, 285 S.2d 796, 800 (La. 1978) (because of Ash, courts should
be vigilant that police are not using photographic displays to avoid the counsel re•
quirement). See also People v. Jackson, No. 54539 (Mich., April 16, 1974).
412. N. SOBEL, supra note 11, at 90-92. While the prosecutor has the right "to prepare" witnesses, he or she should not be permitted "to prompt" testimony or identifica•
tions that might othenvise not be given. See State v. Wallace, 285 S.2d 796, 801 (La.
1973).
413. See Comment, supra note 88, at 104-05.
414. See Part IV supra.
415. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), discussed in text accompany•
ing notes 362-65 supra.
416. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 386 n.6 (1968).
417. Hammelmann &: Williams, supra note 240, at 553, recommended that photographic displays be limited to one witness. This, however, could often result in pursuit
of the wrong person. When other' clues are lacking, the police should have leeway to
confirm an identification with other identifications.
418. For existing proposals, see N. SoBEL, supra note 11, at 109-13 (standards for
photographic displays); Read, supra note 36, at 381 (standards for lineups).
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learning the suspect's identity, since there may be a significant
danger of unintentionally conveying this knowledge to the witness. 419 Since some previously reviewed empirical evidence sugge~ts
that witnesses may feel compelled to make an identification whenever they believe the ~uspect is before them,420 the use of confrontations without the suspect may be appropriate.421 In these areas, as
in others, uncertainty admonishes against headlong efforts to adopt
countless regulations supported only by speculative fears. Nevertheless, the legal profession currently has sufficient sophistication to
recognize the appropriate issues and to commission empirical studies
for their answers.
An expanded due process approach may also require certain
mandatory identification procedures to eliminate unnecessary risks
of misidentification. A defendant perhaps should be entitled to a
pretrial lineup before being forced to confront identification witnesses in court, either at the preliminary hearing or at trial.422 In
some cases, an in-court lineup423 or permission for the defendant
to sit among spectators or with a nonsuspect at counsel table may
be appropriate.424 While defense requests for these safeguards are
occasionally honored,425 appellate courts have left the matter to
the trial court's discretion.426 Such indifference is surprising, since
an identification more unreliable than the witness's familiar selection of the conspicuous defendant, frequently after scanning the
courtroom for dramatic effect, is difficult to imagine. In effect, these
defense requests seek only to avoid one-man showups, albeit in the
courtroom. At a minimum, pretrial lineups should be required
419. See Gilligan, supra note 170, at 185 n.13; Williams &: Hammelmann, supra
note 177, at 489.
420. See text accompanying notes 112-14 supra.
421. P. WALL, supra note 26, at 61.
422. But cf. United States v. Cole, 449 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 931 (1972); United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
834 (1970).
423. But cf. United States v. Willi~, 436 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 912 (1971).
424. But cf. United States v. Edward, 439 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1971). Defense counsel
have sometimes provided a decoy without seeking the Court's permission. For a case
in which this resulted in the incarceration of the wrong man, see Duke v. State, Ind. -, 298 N.E.2d 453 (1973). Of course, an identification made from an in-court
lineup would be devastating to the defense.
425. See, e.g., Allen v. Rhay, 431 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
834 (1971).
426. See cases cited in notes 422-24 supra. See also N. SOBEL, supra note 11, at 46-49.
Cf. State v. Riley, 126 Wash. 256, 218 P. 238 (1923) (denying counsel's request to bring
a nonsuspect, masked like the robber, into the room).
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whenever the prosecutor plans to introduce identification evidence
at trial.
VI. THE MALLORY RULE:

PROMPT ARRAIGNMENTS

AND PosTCUSTODY IDENTIFICATIONS

Practically all jurisdictions have legislation or court rules re•
quiring an arrested person to be taken promptly before a commit•
ting authority for preliminary arraignment.427 In Mallory v. United
States,428 the Supreme Court, in an effort to enforce the federal
prompt-arraignment rule,429 held that confessions elicited during a
period of unnecessary prearraignment delay would not be admissible
at trial. 430 Without specifically defining the period of permissible
delay, the Court indicated that the delay could not be "of a nature
to give opportunity for the extraction of a confession."431 Although
Mallory was not a constitutional decision, it prompted many state
courts to adopt similar exclusionary rules. 482 Recently, however,
Mallory has ceased to be a potent weapon in the defense arsenal.
First, Miranda established strong prophylactic safeguards to protect
the privilege against self-incrimination in the police station, thus
eliminating some of the concern underlying the Mallory decision.483
Second, Congress, in title II of the Safe Streets Act of 1968,484 rejected, or at least modified, the Mallory confession rule. 43 G
427. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 764.13 (1968); PA. R. CRIM, P. 118. A listing
of these provisions can be found in ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE·ARRAIGNl\lENT PROCEDUilE
app. IV (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
428. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
429. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) requires arresting officers to take tbe defendant before
tbe nearest available magistrate "without unnecessary delay." FED. R. CRIM. P. !i(c)
requires the magistrate, among otber things, to advise tbe defendant of his right to
retained or appointed counsel.
430. 354 U.S. at 453. See also Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948) (the
Court's first decision applying an exclusionary rule to enforce Rule 5); McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (applying an exclusionary rule to enforce an earlier
federal prompt-arraignment statute).
431. 354 U.S. at 455.
432. Although constitutional concerns underlie Mallory and McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), the Court carefully based both holdings on its supervisory
authority over the federal courts. State courts may have been influenced by the con•
stitutional overtones in the decisions. See, e.g., People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102
N.W.2d 738 (1960).
433. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Since tbe police are now required
to give constitutional warnings, the need for judicial advice, at least according to some
authorities, is no longer apparent. Compare Pettyjohn v. United States, 419 F.2d 651
(D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1058 (1970) with United States v. Keeble, 459
F.2d 757 (8tb Cir. 1972). See also Frazier v. United States, 419 F,2d 1161 (D.C. Cir, 1969),
434. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L, No. 90-351, tit. II,
§ 70l(a), 82 Stat. 210 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970)).
435. 18 U.S.C. § 350l(c) (1970) provides tbat a voluntary confession shall not be
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Perhaps unwittingly, Kirby may provide the impetus for jurisdictions to breathe new life into the moribund Mallory rule, but
in the context of eyewitness identifications rather than confessions.436
If the right to counsel applies at all critical stages after the initiation
of formal judicial charges, the defendant has a significant interest
in a prompt arraignment, before a precharge lineup without counsel
can be conducted. Two issues merit consideration. First, do formal
judicial proceedings, ·with the concomitant right to counsel, actually
commence at the preliminary arraignment? Second, if the adversary
system does commence ·with the preliminary arraignment, should
Mallory be exhumed and applied in this new context?
Kirby did not explicitly define when a criminal prosecution
commences for sixth amendment right-to-counsel purposes. The
Court merely commented that all previous right-to-counsel precedent had involved "points of time at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment."437 Lower courts interpreting this language have expressed
conflicting viewpoints. At one extreme, a federal court has taken
the view that it would be a "twist of logic" to interpret Kirby, a
decision obviously intended to limit the sixth amendment, as extending the Wade-Gilbert counsel rules into preindictment stages.488
At the other extreme, another federal court has indicated that a
criminal prosecution commences, at least in some instances, when a
warrant is obtained for the defendant's arrest. 439 Such differences
will continue as long as courts believe that Kirby requires them to
inadmissible solely because of prearraignment delay "if such confession was made or
given ••• within six hours immediately following ••• arrest." It is not altogether clear
whether the Mallory rule could apply where the prearraignment delay exceeds six hours.
436. Presumably, 18 U.S.C. § 350l(c) (1970), would not preclude federal courts from
applying Mallory to identification evidence, since the statute only addresses the effect
of delay on the admissibility of confessions. Other sections of the statute, however,
indicate that Congress would not favor a new exclusionary rule for identification evidence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3502 (1970), which attempts to repeal Wade and Gilbert by
making all eyewitness identification testimony admissible in the federal courts. Because
of its obvious constitutional infirmities, courts have ignored this latter provision.
437. 406 U.S. at 689.
438, Moore v. Oliver, 347 F. Supp. 1313, 1319 (W.D. Va. 1972).
439. United States ex rel. Robinson v. Zelker, 468 F.2d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert, denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973). But cf. United States v. Counts, 471 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.),
cert, denied, 411 U.S. 935 (1973). For other cases applying the right to counsel before
indictment or information, see Arnold v. State, 484 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. 1972); State v.
Tingler, 31 Ohio St. 2d 100, 285 N.E.2d 710 (1972); Dickson v. State, 492 S.W.2d 267
(Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Contra, State v. Branch, 108 Ariz. 351, 498 P.2d 218 (1972);
State v. West, 484 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. 1972). Some courts apparently fail to recognize the
issue. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 6 m. App. 3d 500, 285 N.E.2d 515 (1972).
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look to local procedures in determining when a criminal prosecution
commences. Why local procedures should govern, however, is not
altogether clear. For example, some jurisdictions, in order to protect the defendant's interest in a speedy trial, require the most
binding indication of intent to prosecute, such as the filing of an
indictment or an information,440 before tolling the statute of limitations. But the concerns surrounding the right to counsel may be
entirely different, thus mandating a different result.441 In fact, if
a criminal prosecution cannot commence until an information or
indictment tolls the statute of limitations, Goleman v. Alabama,442
which required counsel at preliminary examinations, cannot be
justified.
Despite the diversity of practices, a convincing argument can be
made that a criminal prosecution commences at least with the preliminary arraignment when a formal complaint is filed in court
against the accused. According to Kirby, the line must be drawn at
"the starting point of our .whole system of adversary criminal jus•
tice," the point at which tp.e government "has committed itself to
prosecute."443 Professor Miller, supporting his exhaustive analysis
of the charging function with extensive field study data, has called
the decision to file a complaint "tp.e heart of the charging process.''444
Similarly, to an American Law Institute study committee, "[t]he
issuance of a complaint by the prosecuting attorney or other authorized official signifies a formal decision to charge~ a person with
a specified offense."445 It would defy common sense to say that a
criminal prosecution has not commenced against a defendant who,
440. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1970).
441. The Supreme Court has even interpreted the same constitutional language
•differently in varying conte."l'.ts. See, e.g., United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971)
(criminal prosecution for sixth amendment speedy trial purposes commences with
indictment, information, or arrest).
442. 399 U.S. I (1970).
443. 406 U.S. at 689.
444. F. l\fn.LER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSI'EGT WITH A CruME 14
(1969). · Professor Miller also indicated that application for an arrest warrant can rep•
resent a decision to bring charges against the defendant. Id. at 13-14.
445. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 6.02 &: commentary at 198
(Tent. Draft No. I, 1966). The committee also viewed the preliminary arraignment as
a stage of the criminal prosecution warranting counsel's assistance for tl1e accused:
Even if there is not a constitutional right to counsel at the first appearance, as a
matter of policy it is wise to assure that the defendant is represented at the first
appearance. At the first appearance the judge is required to determine whether
there exists reasonable cause to support the complaint and to fix bail or other
pre-trial release conditions, both of which decisions are critical to the defendant's
securing his immediate freedom and require representation and advocacy.
ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE art. 310, commentary at 79-80 (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1972). Whether or not the preliminary arraignment itself should be deemed
a critical stage, the Institute's committee is certainly correct in describing the arraignment as an important part of the adversary process.
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perhaps incarcerated and unable to afford judicially imposed bail,
awaits preliminary examination on the authority of a charging document filed by the prosecutor, less typically by the police, and approved by a court of law.
Whether state and federal jurisdictions should adopt Mallorytype exclusionary rules for delayed prearraignment identification
procedures without counsel is a more difficult problem, depending
in part on the function of a prompt-arraignment requirement. In
the decisions leading up to Mallory, the Court emphasized that the
prompt-arraignment rule was designed "to check resort by officers
to 'secret interrogation of persons accused of crime.' " 446 Mallory
repeated this emphasis447 but also noted that a prompt arraignment
assures the defendant early advice concerning his rights to remain
silent and to have counsel's assistance.448
Judicial advice concerning constitutional rights constituted an
important safeguard to a defendant subject to police interrogation,
especially before Miranda. Prior to Wade, however, judicial advice
could not benefit a defendant subject to pretrial identification procedures. Since the prompt-arraignment rule seemed to serve few
functions outside the confession context, courts refused to apply it
to exclude identification evidence.449 After Wade, a few courts recognized the increased importance of prompt arraignments and
Mallory's exclusionary rule.45 ° Chief Justice Burger, then a circuit
judge, most succinctly described the interrelationship of Wade and
Mallory:
The reason our earlier holdings do not apply is that the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Wade ... has made the underlying rationale of those cases irrelevant. . . . [T]he reason for not
applying Mallory to a lineup identification was that a lineup in the
absence of counsel before Wade was a perfectly legitimate procedure
... and that Mallory was concerned with improper "interrogation."
It was natural £or the cases following Mallory to concentrate on the
446. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 412 (1948), quoting McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 344 (1943). See also United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944)
(confession not product of delay). But cf. United States v. Nygard, 324 F. Supp. 863
(!I'/.D. Mo. 1971) (using Mallory to suppress a gun).
447. The Court found a prompt-arraignment rule a safeguard against "those repre•
hensible practices known as the 'third degree' which, though universally rejected as
indefensible, still find their way into use." 354 U.S. at 452-53, quoting McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344 (1943).
448. 354 U.S. at 454.
449. See Williams v. United States, 419 F.2d 740, ?42 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (citing
cases).
450. See United States v. Broadhead, 413 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1017 (1970); Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972). Cf. Williams v. United States, 419 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Contra, People v. Matthews, 28
Mich. App. 473, 184 N.W.2d 474 (1970).
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exclusion of utterances, but not other forms of evidence. But Wade
has changed this. Now that the right to counsel is an integral part of
the lineup procedure, the warnings that are given at presentment
and the opportunity to have counsel appointed are highly relevant
to the lineup situation...• Since the Mallory rule was a response
to the protections afforded by prompt presentment, it is appropriately
applied to the lineup situation in the wake of Wade.4 61

The Mallory rule is even more important if, under Kirby, a
criminal prosecution commences for sixth amendment purposes with
preliminary arraignment. If the Mallory rule is not applied, the
police will be able to violate prompt-arraignment statutes and court
rules in order to avoid the constitutional right to counsel at postarraignment lineups. While never to be condoned, police illegality
deserves special condemnation when utilized to flout constitutional
requirements.452 Co,:urts can only disparage the Constitution's exalted role in our society by minimizing the consequences of such
illegality.453
VII.

REMEDIES: THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND JURY
INSTRUCTIONS

In Gilbert v. California,454 the Supreme Court concluded, without much discussion, that only a "per se exclusionary rule" for testimony referring to a lineup identification made in the absence of
counsel would be an effective sanction to assure law enforcement
compliance with the right to counsel. To the Court, the desirability
of deterring constitutionally objectionable lineups outweighed the
undesirability of excluding relevant evidence.466 In United States v.
451. Adams v. United States, 399 F,2d 574, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (concurring opinion),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1067 (1969).
452. Cf. Hogan &: Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue,
47 GEO. L.J. 1, 28-33 (1958),
453. Strict enforcement of prompt-arraignment rules should not preclude the police
from conducting "open crime" lineups. After making an arrest for one crime, police
frequently conduct lineups before witnesses in similar but unsolved crimes. If prompt
arraignments are required, the arraignment judge can either condition the defendant's
release on his return for the desired lineups or delay release until the lineup is conducted. See United States v. Allen, 408 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also McGowan,
Constitutional Interpretation and Criminal Identification, 12 WM. &: MARY L. REv. 235,
246-48 (1970). Once probable cause to arrest is established, the defendant cannot justi•
fiably complain about reasonable intrusions on his liberty. Cf. Gustafson v. Florida,
42 U.S.LW. 4068, 4070 (U.S., Dec. 13, 1973) (Powell, ,J,, concurring) ("an individual
lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person"). The prompt-arraignment rule, therefore, can protect
the defendant's constitutional right to counsel without impeding effective law enforce•
ment.
454. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
455. 388 U.S. at 278.
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Wade, 466 the Court concluded that extension of the per se exclusionary rule to in-court identification testimony would be unduly
harsh, while confinement of the rule to out-of-court identifications
would inadequately assure compliance with the counsel requirement. The Court resolved the dilemma by holding that the prosecutor must have an opportunity to prove the absence of taint from the
illegally procured identification.457
In the fourth amendment context, years of fervent debate preceded the Court's conclusion that the exclusionary rule provides the
most effective safeguard against police illegality.458 Yet, in establishing a right to counsel at lineups, a right not presaged in• a single
jurisdiction,459 the Court, without the benefit of debate, apparently
assumed that no other remedy would suffice. The Court did not
even specify the possible alternatives being rejected as it had done
in the search and seizure area.460 Since criminal prosecutions without
identification evidence are difficult to imagine,461 the Court's rulings
understandably generated substantial antipathy, usually and unfortunately directed at the counsel requirement rather than at the
remedy. Dissenting in Wade, Justice White recognized a dominant
source of the discontent:
It matters not how well the witness knows the suspect, whether the
·witness is. the suspect's mother, brother, or long-time associate, and
no matter how long or well the witness observed the perpetrator at
the scene of the crime. The kidnap victim who has lived for days
·with his abductor is in the same category as the witness who has had
only a fleeting glimpse of the criminal. Neither may identify the
suspect without defendant's counsel being present.462
Of course, Justice White exaggerated the problem. While Gilbert
would preclude a suspect's mother or brother from referring to an
out-of-court identification made ·without counsel, the prosecutor
could easily establish an independent source for an in-court identification. Justice White, however, did correctly perceive the difficulty
456. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
457. 388 U.S. at 241.
458. The Supeme Court adopted the exclusionary rule for federal cases in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court

refused to apply the e.xclusionary rule to state criminal proceedings. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruled Wolf,
459. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299 (1967).
460. The alternatives included criminal prosecution of the police officers and civil
suits. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-53 (1961).
461. See United States v. Brown, 461 F.2d 134, 145-46 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon,
C.J., dissenting).
462. 388 U.S. at 251.

792

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 72:717

in establishing an independent source for witnesses not previously
acquainted with the defendant. The ingenuity displayed by lower
courts in finding an independent source468 has not diminished the
force of his criticism. An exclusionary rule made farcical by strained
factual analysis, almost blatantly defying the obligation to uphold
the Constitution and the Supreme Court's interpretation of it, is
even less acceptable than an unduly harsh rule.
An exclusionary remedy for right-to-counsel violations does not
automatically follow from the use of that remedy in fourth amendment cases. The two areas can be distinguished by drawing an analogy to the malum in se-malum prohibitum dichotomy in substantive
criminal law. Generally, conduct that is malum in se would be considered offensive apart from its legal prohibition; conduct that is
malum prohibitum is wrong only in the sense that it violates positive law.464 Although criminal liability theorists have convincingly
criticized these distinctions,465 they offer a useful point of departure
for exclusionary-rule analysis.
The abhorrence that democratic societies have for unreasonable
searches and seizures predates the Constitution.466 As Justice Frankfurter so eloquently stated, "[t]he security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police . . . is basic to a free society" and
"implicit in the 'concept of ordered liberty.' " 467 Therefore, the
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, though it be unquestionably relevant and perhaps crucial to conviction, can be justified for
several reasons. First, exclusion provides some deterrence against the
malum in se conduct of the _police.468 Second, by excluding the evidence, courts refuse to become accessories, albeit after the fact, to
a basic constitutional wrong.469 Finally, although this is not articulated in the cases, exclusion serves an important educative function.
By forcing judges, lawyers, law students, and police to grapple fre•
quently wi~ search and seizure issues, the exclusionary rule raises
463. See Note, supra note 20.
464. See generally J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLFS OF CRIMINAL LAw 337-42 (2d cd,
1960); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 784-91 (2d ed. 1969).
465. See, e.g., J. HALL, supra note 464, at 339-42.
466. See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1030 (C.P. 1795).
467. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
468. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 · (1965). Recently, several critics
have questioned the efficacy of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent to illegal police
conduct. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 413-27 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
37 U. Cm. L R.Ev. 665 (1970).
469. Cf. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 225 (1969); Lee v. Florida, ll92
U.S. 278, 385-86 (1968). Recently, this rationale has been overshadowed by the emphasis
on deterrence.
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the level of consciousness, and therefore underscores the primacy,
of fourth amendment concerns.
On the other hand, violation of the right to counsel at lineups
can best be described as malum prohibitum. As previously demonstrated, Wade and Gilbert were not concerned with vindicating the
right to counsel as such, but instead were concerned with protecting
the defendant's right to a fair trial.470 In the fourth amendment
area, the invasion of a basic right occurs the moment the police
behave illegally. whether or not criminal prosecution follows; in
the identification area, the denial of counsel, which itself invades
no inherent right, only becomes significant upon the introduction
of evidence at trial. A suspect not identified at a lineup held in the
absence of counsel could hardly claim a violation of his basic rights.
In view of these considerations, excluding identification evidence
appears to be an inappropriately drastic remedy.471 First, since the
offense is merely malum prohibitum, the interest in deterrence may
be outweighed by the interest in admitting probative evidence.
Second, the accessory role of the courts is not so pernicious, especially if some modicum of fairness-the primary concern of Wade
and Gilbert-<:an be preserved at trial. Finally, since the right to
counsel at lineups is not itself basic to a free society, the educative
value of incessant litigation must be de minimus, at best.
The malum in se-malum prohibitum distinction is more difficult to perceive in some contexts. For instance, the exclusion of
evidence for violations of nonconstitutional prompt-arraignment
rules, as recommended in the last section, may appear inconsistent
with a reluctance to exclude evidence for sixth amendment violations. This is admittedly a close question, as the vehement criticism of
Mallory well attests.472 Nevertheless, it can be argued that violations
of the prompt-arraignment rules lean somewhat closer toward the
malum in se segment of the continuum. Practically every jurisdiction has legislation· requiring prompt arraignments.473 The pervasiveness of these rules, as the Supreme Court has recognized,.
indicates their central role in the administration of criminal justice. 474 The rules constitute an essential safeguard against third
degree tactics, which democratic and civilized societies have universally condemned.475 Moreover, the very act of delaying arraign470. See Part III supra.
471. Cf. P. WAU., supra note 26, at 181.
472. See Hogan &: Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue,
47 GEO. L.J. l (1958).
473. See note 427 supra and accompanying text.
474. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1943).
475. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344 (1943).
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ment affects the defendant substantively, since at least one purpose
of the prompt-arraignment rules is to assure an early opportunity
to regain liberty by posting bail.476
Aside from these considerations, there is yet another reason for
distinguishing the needs for an exclusionary remedy in the fourth
and sixth amendment areas. Since an illegal search does not affect
the probative value of items seized, it would be unrealistic to ask
a jury to discount evidence because of police illegality.471 In contrast, the denial of counsel at lineups may have a negative impact
on the probative value of the resultant identification evidence. In
these cases it would not be unrealistic to expect the jury to weigh
the evidence accordingly. True, the rules of evidence often preclude
the jury from considering-relevant evidence, but the recent trend
favors admissibility of all probative evidence in the absence of
social policies, such as police deterrence, that might warrant exclusion.478 As long as adequate safeguards are employed to assure
informed judgment, the jury should generally be trusted to evaluate
the probative worth of evidence.
In view of these differences, the following proposals are offered
with some misgivings and subject to certain provisos. The exclusionary rule should be abolished on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction
basis for right-to-counsel violations at pretrial identification procedures, and exclusionary remedies should not be adopted for violations of the prophylactic due process rules proposed in this Article.
Violations of the Stovall-Simmons rule do warrant continued exclusion, since such violations necessarily indicate the substantial unreliability of identification evidence.479 The risk of misidentification in
these cases is substantially greater than in those cases only involving
a violation of a prophylactic rule.
Any proposal to abolish the exclusionary remedy generates concern that substantive constitutional safeguards will be eviscerated.
This justifiably imposes a burden on the advocates of abolition to
propose an adequate substitute. Accordingly, jury instructions cautioning against the deficiencies in eyewitness identification and apprising the jury of the particular constitutional violation, with its
concomitant, gratuitous increase in the risk of misidentification,
476. See Hogan &: Snee, supra note 472, at 24-25.
477. Cf. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (jury deciding guilt cannot be e."<pected to discount involuntary confessions).
478. See, e.g., the expansion of hearsay exceptions discussed in text accompanying
notes 254-61 supra. Search and seizure evidence, of course, is excluded for policy reasons unrelated to probative value.
479. See Part V(A) supra.
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should be considered as a substitute. To the extent possible, this
proposal should be empirically tested, first with simulated reality
experiments and then, as the exclusionary rule is abolished in cer.;
tain jurisdictions, with field studies. To qualify for the exclusionary
rule's abolition, a jurisdiction should be required to promulgate
regulations demonstrating adherence to the counsel requirements
and prophylactic rules that this Article proposes. These regulations,
as recommended in an earlier section, should also be required to
provide general guidelines for police conduct not subject to specific
constitutional proscriptions.480
The efficacy of a constitutional right varies in direct proportion
to the potency of the available remedy. A remedial jury instruction
can adequately deter constitutional violations only by substantially increasing the likelihood of acquittal where improperly obtained
identification evidence constitutes a crucial part of the prosecution's
case. Since federal constitutional rights are at stake, the proposed
remedy should not vary in substance and in effect from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, The Supreme Court can assure uniformity and
maximize deterrence by dictating at least the general outlines of
the remedial instructions. The Court certainly has the same authority to impose remedial instructions as it had to impose the
exclusionary rule in the first place.
Remedial instructions should complement general instructions
cautioning the jury against the danger of misidentification. Recently,
some courts have proposed general cautionary instructions,481 but
these proposals have not been sufficiently concrete to apprise the
jury of the magnitude of the problem. The British Law Revision
Committee has also proposed legislation requiring judges "to warn
the jury of the special need for caution before convicting the accused in reliance on the correctness" of identification testimony.482
The requirement would apply whenever the prosecution's case
"depends wholly or substantially" on the correctness of identification testimony, even in cases involving more than one eyewitness.
While certainly a step in the right direction, the proposal suffers
from a failure to specify the content of the recommended instruction. Although instructions must be tailored to the facts of a par480. See Part V(B) supra.
481. See, e.g., United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 528 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 958 (1971) (adopting approach of the Pennsylvania courts); United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 557-59 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (strongly urging trial courts to use instructions similar to those adopted in Barber). Contra, United States v. Evans, 484 F.2d 1178
(2d Cir. 1973).
482. See BRITISH REPORT, supra note 36, at 116-21, annex 1, § 21.
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ticular case, some minimal standards would seem appropriate. The
evidence that this Article reviewed concerning the dangers of wrong•
ful conviction warrants an instruction along the following lines:
One of the most iniportant issues in this case concerns the identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. Identification testimony must be received with the greatest of caution. Scientific studies have amply demonstrated the dangers of mistake in
human perception and identification. Some evidence indicates that
the danger increases the more excited the observer. Many cases of
·wrongful conviction have been reported. In some cases, several
witnesses incorrectly identified the defendant; in one of the most
dramatic, seventeen witnesses mistakenly identified the accused.
Often the actual offender and the defendant did not resemble each
other.

In evaluating the identification evidence in this case, you should
consider the opportunity to observe the offender at the time of the
crime, the lighting conditions, the length of time that elapsed between the crime and the first identification by the witness of the
defendant, and the certain_ty or doubt expressed by the witness. The
government has the burden of proving identity beyond a reasonable
doubt, but it is not essential that the witness himself be free from
doubt. To convict, you the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification. If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person
who committed the crime, you must find him not guilty. 4BS

This instruction should be given whenever identification is a
disputed issue. Remedial instructions should be added between the
first and second paragraphs whenever the police violate the right
to counsel or fail to obey a due process prophylactic rule. For example, if the police conduct a station-house showup instead of a
lineup, an instruction along the following lines should be given:
Because of the scientifically proven dangers of mistaken identification, the law has established certain rules for the conduct of identi483. This proposal is based in part on the recommendations contained in the cases
cited in note 481 supra. The reference to the example of mistaken identifications by
17 witnesses comes from E. BORCHARD, supra note 30, at 1-3. Some have argued that an
instruction referring to the difficulty encountered by members of one race in identifying those of another race should also be given. See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d
552, 559 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). Some empirical data supports
this view. See Malpass &: Kravitz, Recognition for Faces of Own and Other Race, 13
J. PERS. &: Soc. PSYCH, 330 (1969) (surprisingly showing, however, that blacks scored
better in identifying whites than in identifying other blacks; the lowest scores were of
whites attempting to identify blacks). Racial prejudice may cause stereotyping that
makes identification difficult. For some evidence that such stereotyping is on the wane,
at least among college students, see Karlins, Coffman &: Walters, On the Fading of
Social Stereotypes: Studies in Three Generations of College SWdents, 13 J. P.ms. &:
Soc. PSYCH. I (1969). For a case in which expert testimony convinced a trial judge that
a white victim could not accurately identify a black defendant, see Regina v. Peterkin,
125 Can. Crim. Cas. 228 (Que. Ct. Sess. 1959).
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fication procedures. One of the most significant dangers is that the
identification procedure will itself mislead the witness into identifying the wrong person. For example, when the police present only
one person to the witness, they magnify the risk of mistake. The
witness, though perfectly honest, is likely to be misled into believing
that the police must have captured the right person if they are presenting him [her] for identification. A much safer procedure is to
conduct a lineup, where the witness is tested by being forced to pick
the defendant from a group of men. Because lineups are much more
reliable, the law has forbidden the police from conducting one-man
showups when a lineup can be held. In this case, the police, without
justifiable excuse, violated that law. In doing this, they unnecessarily
increased the risk of mistaken identification. In evaluating the identification evidence in this case, you should consider this violation and
the unnecessary risk it caused.

Similarly, remedial instructions should be drafted to cover violations of the other substantive constitutional rules proposed in this
Article.
In summary, the dangers of mistaken identification warrant
strict, prophylactic constitutional safeguards. Violation of these safeguards, however, should not always result in the complete loss of
identification evidence. The need for the evidence may often outweigh the benefits obtained by excluding the evidence. It is hoped
that the proposed jury instructions will accomplish several objectives. First, they will alert the jury to the inherent dangers in identification testimony. Second, they will alert the jury to the increased
dangers when the police flout appropriate constitutional safeguards.
Finally, by increasing the probability of acquittal when constitutional safeguards are violated, they will sufficiently deter improper
identification techniques. If the instructions do accomplish these
objectives, the exclusionary rules can safely be eliminated.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Empirical research and reported instances of ·wrongful conviction indicate a need for greater sensitivity to the risk of unreliability
inherent in eyewitness identifications than is reflected in Kirby,
Biggers, and Ash. From a legal perspective, Kirby and Ash are
neither well reasoned nor consistent with precedent. Nevertheless,
while Ash should be reconsidered, Kirby's sixth amendment limitation can be justified by policy reasons, including, primarily, the
need to preserve constitutional flexibility in the precharge stages
of the criminal process. Since Kirby limited its discussion to sixth
amendment analysis, it does not preclude consideration of alternate
bases for the right to counsel at pretrial identification procedures.
In particular, due process should require counsel's assistance at post-
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custody station-house lineups and postcustody photographic displays.
Unlike the sixth amendment, due process permits a balancing of
interests that would enable the status quo to be maintained with
respect to prompt on-the-scene identifications. Due process is also
sufficiently flexible to permit, in certain ·,rare cases, postcustody
photographic displays in the absence of counsel. Biggers cannot be
faulted, if it is interpreted as preserving the option to adopt a due
process prophylactic approach in future cases. This Article proposes
prophylactic rules to prohibit one-man showups and photographic
displays whenever lineups are feasible. Bringing the various sections
together, this Article proposes a relatively simple five-step analysis:
I. Is the identification procedure prohibited by a prophylactic
due process rule?
2. If the procedure is not prohibited, does the sixth amendment
right to counsel apply? (Kirby's limitation would be accepted.)
3. If the sixth amendment does not apply, does due process require the assistance of counsel?
4. Did a violation of a prompt-arraignment statute or rule pre- ·
elude the defendant from having counsel's assistance at the identification procedure?

5. Did the identification procedure result in a violation of the
Stovall-Simmons rule?

This Article also proposes the gradual abolition of the exclusionary rule for identification evidence except with respect to
Stovall-Simmons and prompt-arraignment rule violations. Jury instructions, tailored to the particular constitutional violation, should
replace the exclusionary rule in all other instances .. This recommendation is subject to ttvo provisos. First, the efficacy of the instructions would have to be tested empirically.484 Second, to free itself of
the exclusionary remedy, a jurisdiction would have to adopt regulations demonstrating adherence to the prophylactic constitutional
rules.
The risk of mistaken identification can never be eliminated.
Nevertheless, a system historically dedicated to protecting the innocent from wrongful conviction should take every reasonable step to
minimize that risk. In the words of the British Criminal Law Revision Committee, "The best . . . that can be done is to reduce
the danger of injustice in an area where the administration of the
criminal law is particularly vulnerable to mistake .• , ." 486
484. Cf. Doob 8: Kirshenbaum, supra note 204.
485. BRITISH REPORT, supra note 36, at 117.

